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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STANLEY
,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs,

case No. 920221-CA

;
1
j

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant-Appellee•

Priority No. ^v>

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STANLEY L. WADE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Stanley j
"

I'h :i
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The distric
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"Wade") appeal:; .* decision r

I: lii

-

;

. :

favor

1

i

1 the appellee and appellant

The Utah Court

pur siicinf; I 11 lit all

« *• .

f Appeals has jurisdiction

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Was the district court judge in this case biased

against Wade to an extent which prevented Wade from receiving a
fair trial?
2.

Was it prejudicial error for the district court to

allow F, C. Stangl III ("Stangl") to raise the issue of an
alleged "oral agreement" for the first time at trial without
allowing Wade to rebut that argument on the basis of the Statute
of Frauds and the Statute of Limitations?
3.

Did the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of

Limitations require the district court to find that the alleged
oral agreement could not form the basis for an assumption by Wade
of an obligation to pay more than his share of property taxes?
4.

Was the district court's determination that the parties

agreed to allocate taxes based upon the proportionate sizes of
their parcels clearly erroneous as a matter of law?
5.

Absent mutual consent by the parties to cillocate taxes

based upon acreage, was the district court required to apply the
doctrine of equitable conversion, as instructed by the Utah
Supreme Court, to determine the appropriate allocation of taxes
based upon value?
2

Standard of Review
T h e i striiues abo 1 'H pi"eapl,i,+ " pnf? ? i on* • I LIS» - n"C! and quest ions of
1 aw

Therefore, this Court i:-. u- : required - accord any

deference ~
i ssues,

*••- district court - Eindings relative
v:i ew th<

v. Ben Hame Corp,, 836 P.2d

:

•.•!••

these
rown of Alt a

(Utah App I

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four year s:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation,
or liability not founded upon an instrument
in writing
Ut a h Code Is nn

§ 25- 5 -4

Certain agreements voi*
and subscribed.

In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within one year from the
making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt
default or miscarriage of another.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case involving the review of the district court's

decision in Wade v. Stanql, C-87-357.
This case began as an action seeking to compel the
conveyance of title to a parcel of land.

An issue arose

regarding a party's alleged failure to pay property taxes.
On an appeal from a summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court
found no contractual default as a result of the alleged failure
to pay property taxes. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case
to the district court for a determination of the taxes properly
attributable to the parties under the doctrine of equitable
conversion.
The district court did not proceed under that doctrine and
instead, found, erroneously, that the intent of the written
contract was to allocate the taxes based upon acreage.
This appeal is brought contesting the district court's
judgment.

Specifically, appellant requests this Court to remand

the case to the district court with specific instructions to
allocate property taxes between the parties under the doctrine of
equitable conversion based upon the value of the property.
Further, appellant requests this Court to order Appellee to
transfer title to him pursuant to their contract.
4

II.

COURSE OF T H E PROCEEDINGS hMI) DISPOSITION BELOW
On Jr/nuicJi v ,'""0

Il "L#8

111 d J irit; i 11-appe

I. La mil'

liatJe

I i J. HI i

a

contract action attempting to obtain t h e warranty deed to
property which he h a d purchased from defendant-appellee Stangl.
The contract pri ce for th i s pr oper ty hac
January 1985.
as Exhibit A)

een paid in hi J I l»y

(See Affidavit: of Stanley . ,
•"• r

contending that Wade

: , attached hereto

eci an .Amended Answer and Counterclaim
Dreached t h e contract

property taxes and therefore w a s n o t entitled *

."a :i ] :i ng t : pa}
:onveyance of

t:i tj e.
On October ?n
by

I ^ S Q ~~ appeal from summary judgment entered

district court . i Stangl

1

]

:h

* h

i

in dispute.

T h e Utah Supreme Court vacated -

r^r. Supreme found
:);pei: ty taxes
summary judgment

and remanded t h e case to t h e district court with instructions t o
det: enn i ne t he amount < > I I'.axus at: l;.i i but at» I e to Wade , in propei I: y
under the doctrine ,.- equitable conversion, '
On remand, rr ? district court did init determine t h e amount
o t I axew at. 1 r J b

It u U'anJi"" • pi i ipe i I \ unde i I he ,Joct i i lie el

equitable conversion as instructed by t h e Utah Supreme Court.
i
Specifically, the Court stated that "LtJhe contract does not impose on the buyer any obligation
to pay real property taxes except in the year 1978, and buyer is not therefore in default under the contract
for non-payment of taxes. Appellant agrees that he is obligated to pay taxes actually accruing to his land,
by reason of the doctrine of equitable conversion. However, the amount of taxes assessed since the year 1978
attributable to the parcel purchased and possessed by appellant is still in dispute." Remittitur No. 890256,
Oct 27 1989, attached hereto as Exhibit B
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The district court found, instead, that the parties had agreed to
allocate taxes based upon acreage rather than value.
Specifically, the court found "that it was the parties1 intent at
the time of execution of the written agreement and thereafter
that the taxes should be apportioned based on the respective
amount of land owned by each party."

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, p. 4, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
The court based this finding upon two alternative theories.
First, that letters and documents sent by Stangl to Wade showing
Stanglfs calculations of taxes based upon acreage (versus value)
of land indicated such an intent.

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, p. 4 (See Exhibit C).

Second, that the

parties had reached an oral agreement to base the taxes on
acreage rather than value, and said oral agreement was either a
separate and subsequent contract concerning property tax
allocation, or an oral clarification or modification of the 1978
written contract.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4

(See Exhibit C ) .
Based upon the above factors, the district court awarded
judgment in Stangl1s favor in the amount of $100,699.90. This
consisted of $54,835 in taxes, $19,817 in interest, and
$26,047.90 in attorney's fees.
as Exhibit D.

Judgment, p. 2, attached hereto

Including post-judgment interest, Wade has paid
6

$106,386.97 to Stangl.

See Partial Satisfaction of Judgment,

attached hereto as Exhibit E.

However, he still has not received

title to his property.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On May 16, 1978, Wade and Stangl entered into a written

installment land contract whereby Wade agreed to purchase 6.87
acres of property from Stangl for $206,100.

See Agreement,

attached hereto as Exhibit F.
2.

The property sold was located at approximately 9200

South, 700 East, Sandy City, Utah.

The 6.87 acres purchased by

Wade ("Wade's property") were part of a larger, 9.63 acre tract
of land owned by Stangl.

Stangl retained ownership of the

remaining 2.76 acres. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
p. 2 (See Exhibit C ) .
3.

Wade's property is situated behind Stangl's retained

property with respect to 700 East Street, and is accessed by a
50-foot wide strip of land which also serves as a non-exclusive
right-of-way for access to Stangl's property.

Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit C).
4.

Pursuant to the 1978 contract, Wade paid Stangl the

agreed-upon purchase price of $206,100. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit C).
in approximately January, 1985

Final payment occurred

(See Exhibit A ) .
7

5.

Paragraph 6 of the 1978 written contract provides that

n

[r]eal property taxes for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the

closing.11

Thus, the parties prorated the 1978 taxes based on (1)

the number of days of the year each party owned the property, and
(2) the area (square footage) owned by each party as compared to
the total area of the 9.63-acre consolidated tract.

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit C ) .
6.

The parties intended and assumed that they would be

separately taxed on their respective parcels following the year
of the closing (1978).

The county taxing authorities, however,

continued to assess the entire 9.68-acre consolidated tract and
did not individually tax the parties1 separate parcels until
1991.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See Exhibit

C); Stipulation of Parties, p. 2, attached hereto as Exhibit G.
7.

Following 1979, Stangl continued to be taixed for the

consolidated property.

Stangl, in turn, charged Wade 71.34% of

the taxes based on square footage or acreage owned by Wade as
compared to the total amount of land within the consolidated
tract.2

See letters and correspondence from Stangl to Wade,

attached hereto as Exhibit H; Memo in opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8, attached hereto as Exhibit I.
2
A calculation of property tax allocation based upon value would have resulted in Wade being
responsible for approximately 56.66% of the taxes. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 7; Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke; valuation form, all attached hereto as Exhibit K.
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8.

Wade paid the taxes for the years 1979-1981 based upon

Stangl's calculations

(See Exhibit G, para. 12). Wade contends

that these payments were made each year under the understanding
that Stangl intended to have the property split for tax purposes
prior to the next tax year.

See Transcript, p. 68, attached

hereto as Exhibit J.
9.

Wade contends that in 1982 he discovered he had paid

and was paying substantially more taxes than, had actually accrued
to his property.

Affidavit of Stanley L. Wade, (See Exhibit A ) .

Therefore, between the years of 1982 and 1991, Wade did not make
payments based upon Stanglfs calculations of apportionment based
on acreage.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3 (See

Exhibit C ) .
10.

Pursuant to the judgment of the court below,3 Wade has

paid $106,386.97, including post judgment interest, to Stangl
(See Exhibit E).

The calculation of taxes by the district court

was based upon acreage, not value.

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, p. 11, (See Exhibit C).

Judgment by the district court for $54,835 in taxes, $19,817 in interest, and 26,047.90 in
attorney's fees, amounting to $100,699.90. Judgment, p. 2 (See Exhibit D). The difference between this figure
and the $106,386.97 figure is post-judgment interest.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Wade requests this Court to order appellee Stangl
to convey title of Wade's property to him pursuant to their
written contract.

Wade also seeks an order from this Court

remanding this case to the district court with instructions to
determine the proper amount of taxes attributable to his property
under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

Further, Wade

requests this Court to instruct the district, court to determine
said taxes based upon the value of the respective parties1
property.
As justification for these requests, Wade intends to show
that the district court's determination of this matter was
clearly erroneous as a matter of law. Wade contends that the
judge in this case was biased against Wade and that this bias
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.

In fact, the results

of this case can be explained in no other way, as the law clearly
supports Wade's positions.
The district court found that the parties entered into an
oral contract, or orally modified the existing contract to
provide for allocation of taxes based upon acreage. Wade
contends that this finding was improper.

The issue of such an

oral contract had never been raised prior to trial.

The district

court not only allowed Stangl to raise it at that point, but
10

refused to allow Wade to rebut the issue because he had not
affirmatively pled the defenses prior to trial. How Wade could
have affirmatively defended issues which had not yet been raised,
and of which he was unaware, is unclear.
The affirmative defenses which Wade attempted to raise at
trial barred the admission of the new issue.

First, the newly

alleged oral contract or orally modified contract was subject to
the statute of frauds.

In fact, the Statute of Frauds clearly

voided such an alleged contract.

Second, any action brought by

Stangl upon the alleged oral agreement was barred by the statute
of limitations.
The district court found, as an alternative to the oral
contract theory, that under the written contract the parties
intended to base tax allocation upon acreage rather than value.
This finding is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's statements
in its Remittitur and clearly inconsistent with applicable laws.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that under the contract there
was no obligation on Wade's part to pay taxes. Additionally,
they recognized the applicability of the doctrine of equitable
conversion as the proper basis upon which to allocate taxes.
Under that doctrine, taxes actually attributable to a party's
property are to be assessed to that party.

These taxes must not

be based upon the acreage of the parcels, as the district court
11

based them, but upon the relative value of the parties1 property.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE WAS CLEARLY BIASED AGAINST WADE AND
THIS BIAS PREVENTED WADE FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL
11

A litigant is entitled to a trial before a judge who is not

biased or prejudiced. . ."

48A C.J.S. §108, p. 728.4

This

right is based upon the "due process clause of the federal
Constitution,5 and on the constitutional right to a fair trial.
. . ."6

Id.

Where a party charges that bias or prejudice unjustly
affected the results of a trial, the court on review is required
to "carefully scrutinize the record to see that no injustice has
been done the complaining party."7

48A C.J.S. § 108, p. 730.

In the case at hand, there was pervasive evidence of
judicial bias.

As a result, Wade was unable to obtain a fair

trial in this matter.

Frausto v. Legal Aid S o c . 563 F.2d 1324 (CA9 1977); United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (CA3
1973).
5

United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842 (CA7 1976); United States v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641 (D.C.
Nev. 1978), aff'd 624 F.2d 869 (CA9 Nev. 1980), cert, den. 101 S.Ct. 568 (1980); MiLliaan v. Stone, 424 F.Supp.
1088 (S.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd 548 F.2d 878 (CA9 Cal. 1977), cert, den. 432 U.S. 908, 53 L.Ed.2d 1081, 97 S.Ct.
2955 (1977).
6

Conforte, 457 F.Supp. 641 (D.C. Nev. 1978).

7
People Ex rel. Little v. Saint Louis Merchants' Bridge Co., 118 N.E. 733 (III. 1918); Aldridge v.
State, 342 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1960).
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The judge in this case recused himself from hearing certain
portions of the case as a result of difficulties he had with
Wade's prior counsel. Apparently, Paul Schwenke, one of Wade's
attorneys felt that the judge's rulings were so inconsistent with
the law and out of line with instructions from the Utah Supreme
Court that he believed Judge Murphy was personally prejudiced
against him.

He wrote a letter to Judge Murphy to that effect.

The judge was affronted by the suggestion of, bias and referred
the matter to the bar.
The Judge also commented at trial that he had had
difficulties with another successor counsel of Wade's. As a
result, the Judge recused himself from deciding particular issues
which he felt might be "intrinsically intertwined with prior
counsel for [Wade]."

Transcript, p. 2 (See Exhibit J).

Wade consented to the Judge's continued handling of the case
under the assumption that the difficulties towards his attorneys
did not extend to a bias against him personally.

Apparently,

however, this was not the case. At crucial points in the trial,
the Judge made decisions which were not based upon the law, and
which Wade can only assume were based upon a bias or prejudice
against him.
As will be discussed below, in one instance, the Judge
allowed evidence of an oral contract or modification of the prior
13

contract to be admitted for the first time at trial.

However, he

refused to allow Wade's counsel to rebut the new issue with
arguments based upon the statute of frauds and the statute of
limitations, thus denying Wade the crucial opportunity to meet
the new issue properly.
law.

This decision was not based upon the

The law clearly provides that new issues can only be

introduced when the opposing party is given a full opportunity to
meet the issue.

It is difficult to see any explanation for the

exclusion of the rebuttal argument other than that the judge was
predisposed against Wade based upon the prior difficulties he had
with Wade's attorney's.
Further, at one point in the case, evidence was submitted
pertaining to a proceeding which Wade went through for fraud.
The Judge apparently leaned heavily on this fact in his
determination to discredit Wade's testimony.

In his concluding

statement, the Judge commented that he chose to discredit Wade's
testimony based in large part upon the fact that Wade had gone
through a fraud proceeding.

Transcript, p. 125 (See Exhibit J ) .

It appears that as a result of this introduction, the judge
failed to decide the case based upon law, but rather, based it
upon his bias towards Wade.

The Judge's reaction to the evidence

regarding Wade's fraud proceeding was clearly and unduly
prejudicial.
14

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON IMPROPER ISSUES AND
UNALLOWABLE EVIDENCE
The district court on remand erroneously determined that the

allocation of property taxes was to be based upon the
proportionate size of the parties1 parcels of land rather than
upon the value of the parcels.
two alternative grounds.

This conclusion was based upon

First, that there was an oral agreement

which either amended the earlier written contract or created a
subsequent contract to allocate taxes based upon acreage.
Second, that letters and billing statements sent by Stangl to
Wade reflecting Stangl's use of acreage to determine
apportionment of taxes reflected the intent of the parties1
written agreement that tax apportionment would be based on the
area owned by each party.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, p. 4 (See Exhibit C).
A.

It was Prejudicial Error for the District Court to
Allow Stangl to Raise the Issue of An "Oral Agreement"
for the First Time at Trial Without Allowing Wade to
Rebut the Argument on the Grounds of the Statute of
Frauds and Statute of Limitations

The first ground upon which the district court relied in
finding that tax allocation should be based upon proportionate
share of property was improper.

The court found that an oral

agreement had been reached by the parties which created an

15

"amendment to the contract" or a "subsequent contract" regarding
the allocation of taxes.
The argument that an oral contract or an amendment to the
contract had been made regarding tax allocation had never been
raised prior to the trial.

Stangl had not advanced this claim in

any pleading or prior court appearance.

All of the discussions

below had rested upon interpreting the written contract.

Thus,

Wade was not on notice of this claim and was prejudiced by the
court's allowance of the issue.
The introduction of a new claim is allowed if two conditions
are met.8

The first requirement is that the parties implicitly

or explicitly consent to its introduction.9

Consent can be

implied by a party's failure to object to the introduction of
evidence relevant to the issue. However,
[a] party cannot be said to have implicitly consented
to the trial of an issue not presented by the pleadings
unless the party should have recognized that the issue
had entered the case at trial. . . . The introduction
of evidence arguably relevant to pleaded issues cannot
serve to give a party fair notice that new issues are
entering the case.

Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure form the basis for the introduction of new issues and state in part that "Cw]hen issues not raised
by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b). The relevant portion of Fed. R.Civ.P. 15
(B) is identical.
o
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987); General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,
545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976).
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Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach Inc., 833
F.2d 1484, 1487 (CA11 Fla. 1987).10

Thus, if evidence relevant

to the new issue is also relevant to one of the issues already in
the case, consent cannot be implied.
In this case, evidence of an alleged conversation between
Stangl and Wade concerning tax apportionment was directly
relevant to the previously raised issue of the intent of the
parties under the contract.

Thus, Wade had ,no reason to know

that the new issue of an oral agreement forming the basis for a
"new contractual agreement" or "amended contractual agreement"
was being introduced.

He reasonably believed that the evidence

was being introduced for the sole purpose of showing intent.
Thus, the first requirement for allowing a new issue was not met,
there was no implicit or explicit consent.
The second requirement for the introduction of a new issue
at trial is that the non-introducing party be given a fair
opportunity to present evidence material to the newly introduced
issue.

Specifically, the Colman court stated that the test is

"whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and
whether it could offer additional evidence if the case were
retried on a different theory." Colman, 743 P.2d at 785, citing
R. A. Pohl Constr. Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266, 267 (CA10
10
,u

See also Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987).
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1981).

The addition of such an issue "should not be permitted

where it would operate to deny a party a fair opportunity to
present evidence material to newly-added issues." Mineral Indus.
& Heavy Constr. Group v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Com., 639 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1981).12
In this case, Wade attempted to raise the issues of the
application of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of
Limitations as they applied to the new issue, of an oral
agreement.

As shown in the following section, if these arguments

had been permitted, they would have barred the admission of this
new issue.

However, the court found that the statute of frauds

and statute of limitations arguments were waived because they had
not been plead prior to trial. Transcript, p. 19, line 22-25
(See Exhibit J).

Therefore, the court did not allow Wade to

rebut the new argument raised by Stangl pertaining to an oral
contract or oral amendment to the prior contract.

In violation

of the requirements set forth above, Wade was not allowed the
opportunity to present evidence crucial to defending against the
new claims.

See also Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 439 (CA10 Okla. 1979), cert, den.
445 U.S. 964, 64 L.Ed.2d 239, 100 S.Ct. 1653 (1980); De Haas v. Empire Petro. Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1229 (CA10
Colo. 1970); Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803, 807 (CA10 Okla. 1941).
12

le§ also International Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888, 890 (CA5 1977).
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1.

The Alleged Oral Contract Between Stangl and Wade
Violated the Statute of Frauds.

If a new contract was created, or the existing contract was
modified by the alleged oral agreement, this change was void
under the Statute of Frauds. According to the Statute of Frauds,
an agreement that extends further than one year or one to
undertake the debts of another individual is void unless it is in
writing and signed by the party who undertakes the
responsibility.13
In this case, Wade allegedly undertook to pay taxes based on
the proportionate share of land he owned.

Under this scenario

Wade would be agreeing to pay for 71.34% of the taxes. Absent
such an agreement (and absent Stanglfs refusal to segregate the
two parcels for tax purposes) the taxing authorities would have
applied an assessment based upon value which would have made Wade
liable for only 56.66% of the total taxes for the parcel.

(See

Exhibit K ) .
In sum, Wade allegedly undertook to pay a substantial
percentage more of the taxes than he was obligated to pay.

Thus,

he assumed a debt which otherwise would have belonged to Stangl.

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In the following
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: (1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof. (2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
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Such an assumption of liability fits directly within the Statute
of Frauds.
In addition, this alleged assumption of liability
purportedly resolved the tax conflict prospectively as the
parties allegedly decided not to have the property segregated for
future tax purposes.

Thus, the alleged agreement would have

covered more than a one year period of time, again placing it
directly within the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
Further, if this alleged oral agreement was not a new
contract, but rather a modification of the old written contract,
it was again void under the Statute of Frauds.

If an original

contract must satisfy the Statute of Frauds, then any subsequent
agreements altering or modifying it must also be in writing and
subscribed by the party to be bound.

Combined Metals, Inc. v.

Bastian, 267 P. 1020 (Utah 1928); Bamberger Co. v. Certified
Prods., Inc.. 48 P.2d 489 (Utah 1936), adhered to 53 P.2d 1153
(Utah 1935).
An installment contract for the sale of land is
unquestionably within the requirements of the statute of frauds,
thus, a modification of that contract is also within the statute.
For this alleged agreement to be enforceable, it must have been
in writing and signed by Wade.

No such evidence has been

produced because there was no such agreement.
20

Because this alleged agreement was not in writing it
violated the Statute of Frauds and was void.

The parties were

required to fall back upon the contract, which did not supply any
guidance regarding taxes. Thus, as found by the Utah Supreme
Court, the laws of equitable conversion applied, requiring the
parties to pay those taxes which were directly attributable to
their properties according to the value thereof.
2.

The Action Brought by Stangl Upon The Alleged Oral
Agreement Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Under Utah law, "[a]n action upon a contract, obligation, or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing. . . . " must
be brought within four years.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-15.

Stangl alleges that Wade and he reached an oral agreement in
1980 to apportion taxes based upon their proportionate share of
land.

The statute above applied directly to such an agreement.

The alleged agreement would create an obligation on Wade's part
to pay a portion of property taxes in excess of the amount he
would be obligated to pay under applicable laws.14
Any action upon this alleged contract, obligation or
liability, could not be brought subsequent to the four years
provided for by the statute of limitations.

Thus, Stangl's claim

that Wade had an obligation to pay taxes in excess of those
14
According to calculations made by Wade's attorney Paul Schwenke, based upon value Wade was liable
for only 56.66% of the taxes. (See Exhibit K).
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required by law, was untimely and barred by the statute of
limitations.
In sum, because the requirements for the admission of a new
issue into a trial were not met in this case, and in fact, the
statute of frauds and statute of limitations precluded the
issue's admission, it was prejudicial for the court to rely upon
those arguments in reaching a decision.

Thus, the first ground

upon which the court rested its determination that tax allocation
should be based upon proportionate areas of land was improper.
B.

The District Court's Determination that the Parties
Agreed to Allocate Taxes Based Upon the Proportionate
Sizes of Their Parcels Was Clearly Erroneous As a
Matter of Law.

The trial court found that "it was the parties' intent at
the time of execution of the written agreement and thereafter
that the taxes should be apportioned based on the respective
amount of land owned by each party."

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, p. 4, #8 (See Exhibit C).

This finding was

the second ground for the district court's determination to
apportion taxes on the basis of acreage and was clearly
erroneous.
The evidence upon which the district court relied in
reaching the above conclusion consisted of letters and documents
sent by Stangl to Wade.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
22

p 4-5, #8-9, (See Exhibit C).

According to 17A Am.Jur.2d § 523,

although intent under a contract or the existence of a
modification of a contract is normally a question for the trier
of fact, the interpretation of documentary evidence passing
between the parties is a question of law for the appellate court
to review.15

Thus, this Court is not required to defer to the

district court's findings based upon the letters and documents
which passed between Stangl and Wade.
The district court's finding that "it was the parties1
intent at the time of execution of the written agreement and
thereafter that the taxes should be apportioned based on the
respective amount of land owned by each party,"16 is not
supported by the evidence.

The court itself stated in a prior

finding that "[t]he parties intended and assumed that they would
be separately taxed on their respective parcels following the
year of the closing (1978)."
Law, p. 3, #6 (See Exhibit C).

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
In fact, Stangl testified that

the expectation of the parties pertaining to the taxes was "that
the taxing authorities would bill each of us for our respective
taxes, and we would each pay our respective taxes for our
parcel."
15

Transcript, p. 11, Lines 18-20 (See Exhibit J).

Hardy v. Ward. 150 N.C. 385, 64 S.E. 171 (1909).

16
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4, #8 (See Exhibit C).
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Thus,

the parties assumed that they would be taxed by the authorities,
who, as a matter of law, tax individuals based upon the value of
their property.
To argue that the intent at the time the contract was
written was that property taxes would be apportioned based upon
the proportionate sizes of the property is ludicrous given the
admission that the original intent was to be taxed separately
based on value.
The only grounds upon which an intent different than that
established above could be shown, is if the contract, and thus
the intent, were modified.

However, as discussed above, because

the contract was in writing, any modification would have to be in
writing also.

Further, in order for a contract to be modified,

"the minds of the parties must have met upon an asserted contract
modification."

Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d

803, 806 (Utah 1979); Marnon v. Vauahan Motor Co., 194 P.2d 992
(Or. 1948).
In this case, the documents which the court relied upon in
determining that the parties had intended the taxes to be
allocated based upon acreage were prepared by Stangl.

There was

no indication in the documents that Wade agreed to this basis for
taxation.

"[A] party cannot by self-serving declarations make

evidence for himself concerning his dealings with the other party
24

or the liability of such other party."

National Importing &

Trading Co. v. E. A. Bear & Co., 155 N.E. 343 (111. 1925); George
J. Cooke Co. v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., 146 N.E. 459 (111.
1925).
Merely because Stangl wished to have the taxes allocated
between himself and Wade based on acreage, and in fact prepared
documents based upon these calculations rather than based on
value, is not evidence that Wade agreed to such an allocation.
According to 17A Am.Jur.2d,
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[t]he mental purpose of one of the

parties to a contract cannot change its terms . . .17 One
receiving an offer to change a contract to which he is a party is
held to be under no obligation to answer it; and his silence
cannot be construed as an acceptance . . .I|18 17A Am.Jur.2d
§520, p. 537. Thus, the documents relied upon by the district
court could not have established a mental intent to change the
contract or enter a new contract.
III. AS INSTRUCTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, THE ONLY
APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF TAXES IN THIS CASE WAS UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
The Utah Supreme Court issued a Remittitur vacating a
summary judgment ruling of the district court and remanding the
17
New York C. R. Co. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152, 64 L. Ed. 502, 40 S. Ct. 287 (1920); Southern Acid &
Sulphur Co. v. Chi Ids, 184 S.w.2d 586 (Ark. 1945).
18

Suitter v. Thompson, 358 P.2d 267 (Or. 1960).
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case (See Exhibit B).

In its Remittitur, the Utah Supreme Court

stated in part:
The contract does not impose on the buyer any
obligation to pay real property taxes except in the
year 1978, and buyer is not therefore in default under
the contract for non-payment of taxes. Appellant
agrees that he is obligated to pay taxes actually
accruing to his land, by reason of the doctrine of
equitable conversion. However, the amount of taxes
assessed since the year 1978 attributable to the parcel
purchased and possessed by appellant is still in
dispute.
(See Exhibit B ) .
The Utah Supreme Court determined that the contract in
question did not provide for an ongoing obligation for real
estate taxes.

Rather, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged Wade's

responsibility to pay taxes under the doctrine of equitable
conversion.
Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion, the buyer,
Wade, is liable for taxes directly attributable to the property
he purchased.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the amount of

taxes actually attributable to Wade's property was a factual
question still in dispute and remanded the case to the district
court to determine that issue. Unfortunately, the district court
did not decide this issue.
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion
the party who is in possession or entitled to
possession at the time of accrual, is ordinarily bound
to pay taxes accruing on the land after the making of
26

the contract and before a conveyance, unless there has
been a delay in making the conveyance caused by the
fault of the other party (seller).
77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser § 326 (1975).19
Thus, the buyer is responsible for paying the taxes which accrue
on the land unless the seller causes a delay in making the
conveyance.
In this case, Wade concedes liability to pay taxes for the
years 1982 through 1984 and only guestions what taxes are
directly attributable to his property.

However, pertaining to

the years 1985 through 1990, Wade rests upon the second part of
the doctrine of equitable conversion.

As mentioned, when a

seller causes a delay in making the conveyance, the buyer is not
liable to pay taxes.

This is not read as a strict transfer of

tax liability to the seller, but rather is generally held to mean
that the buyer is not liable to pay, until the seller performs by
conveying the property.

Annotations, Effect of Delay in Making

Conveyance, 12 A.L.R. 416, 417 (1975) and cases cited therein.
Stangl admits that Wade made all of his payments as required by
the contract (See Exhibit G).

Thus, when Wade made his final

See also 12 A.L.R. 412, 414 (1921) citing Free v. Little. 88 P. 407 (Utah 1907).
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payment on the contract in January of 1985, Stangl was
concurrently obligated to convey the property to Wade.20
Because Stangl did not convey the property to Wade, and
still has not done so, Wade is not obligated to pay the taxes.
Stangl caused "a delay in the conveyance" which excused Wade's
payment of taxes subsequent to 1985.

Stangl"s delay also

resulted in the continuation of this controversy.

If Stangl had

performed and recorded a conveyance in January, 1985, Wade would
have been assessed for his land separately and this controversy
would have been limited to the taxes assessable to Wade's land in
1979-1984.
A.

The Only Appropriate Method of Allocating Taxes Under
the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion is Based Upon the
Relative Value of Each Parties1 Property

Taxation of property by the state must be based upon the
value of the property.

Any other means of allocating taxes

imposes an unfair and unequal burden upon the individual.21
Absent evidence that parties to a contract mutually agreed to
base allocation of taxes upon some other basis, a court must

See Johnson v. Jones, providing that "Cwlhere there is an agreement on the part of one to convey
and on the part of another to pay a definite sum, payment and conveyance are concurrent acts. . ." Johnson,
164 P.2d 893 (Utah 1946). See also 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendors and Purchasers, § 63 (1975).
21
In fact, certain states, such as Maine and Colorado, have enacted Constitutional provisions
requiring allocation of property taxes based upon value as a result of these concerns. Maine Milk Producers,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Agric. Food & Rural Resources, 483 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1984); United States Transmission
Systems, Inc., v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 715 P.2d 1249 (Colo. 1986).
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apply a value method of allocation.

An individual has a right to

be assessed taxes on the same basis as all other individuals and
a court has no authority to violate that right.
In this case, there is no evidence of a mutual agreement
between Stangl and Wade to allocate taxes based upon some other
method•

Therefore the district court violated Wade's rights in

allowing tax allocation on the basis of acreage as opposed to the
value of the parties' parcels of land.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Wade respectfully requests this
Court to order appellee Stangl to convey title of Wade's property
to him pursuant to their written contract.

Wade also requests an

order from this Court remanding this case to the district court
with instructions to determine the proper amount of taxes
attributable to his property under the doctrine of equitable
conversion.

Further, Wade requests this Court to instruct the

district court to determine said taxes based upon the value of
the respective parties' property.
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South 600
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Daniel A. Jensen
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY L.
WADE IN SUPPORT OF HIS
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

vs.

I>
>
)i
1
)
>
]

Case NQ.C87-357

F.C. STANGL III

)

Honorable Michael Murphy

STANLEY L. WADE,
PI ainti-f-f ,

Defendant.
I, Stanley L. Wade,

after being

first duly

sworn, deposed

and says:
1.

On or

about May 16, 1978, I entered into a real estate

contract with the Defendant,
greater portion

wherein

the

sold

me a

of a parcel of land that he owned. The Defendant

retained a smaller frontage portion of
on it.

Defendant

the land

with a building

I took the larger rear acreage.

2.

The Defendant

was taxed

for the larger parcel, and he

in turn split the taxes based on the square footage,
me accordingly.

This

practice went

and charged

on for approximately three

years until the I discovered that I was paying substantially more
than the

taxes actually

accrued to

portion of

the land that I

bought.
3.
amount of

I protested by refusing to pay any more taxes until the
taxes that

ar& actually

t

accrued to my portion of the

0ff54

4.

I

completed

r*y

performance

unde*~

t*>^

cc^t^^ct

\*>

January, 1985, but the Defendant re-Fused to convey me the land.
5.

I

hired

my

attorney

in or about December, 1986, to

enforce my rights under the contract.
6.

I have paid $9,750.86 toward the property taxes between

1978 and 1981.
7.

I am

paying attorney fees in connection with this case

in the sum itemized
motion for summary
8.

That I

in his affidavit

in my attorney's affidavit

in support of this

judgment.
have also paid costs as itemized by my attorney

in support of this motion

I respectfully submit

this affidavit

1990.

for summary judgment.
this

day of March,

4*4-

Stanl'ey ^L. Wade
l'ey j£. Wc
Stanley L. Wade appeared
that he has personal
Subscribed and

personally

before

me

and stated

knowledge of the facts stated herein.
sworn to

before me

this

day o-f March,

1990.
NOTARY
PUBLIC, residing
in Salt Lake County.
My Commission
expires:
Commi-ss

CCC5!

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify that

I caused

to be mailed, postage pre-

paid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing Affidavit to Steven
G. Crocket, attorney for
Suite 1300,

Salt Lake

Defendant, at
City, Utah

185 South

State Street,

84111 this A ,

day o-f March,

1990.
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Regular May Term, 1989

October 5, 1989

Stanley L. Wade,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

REMITTITUR
No. 890256
District No. C87-357

v.
F.C. Stangl, III,
Defendant and Appellee<

Appellant's motion to reverse the judgment entered by
the district court is hereby granted, and the appellee's motion to
affirm the judgment is denied.
The trial court was manifestly in error in granting
summary judgment where material facts are in dispute.

The contract

does not impose on the buyer any obligation to pay real property taxes
except in the year 1978, and buyer is not therefore in default under
the contract for non-payment of taxes. Appellant agrees that he is
obligated to pay taxes actually accruing to his land, by reason of the
doctrine of equitable conversion.

However, the amount of taxes

assessed since the year 1978 attributable to the parcel purchased and
possessed by appellant is still in dispute.
The judgment is vacated, and this matter is remanded to
the trial court for taking evidence and for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this order.
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 7 1989 0 C 3 3 !
Issued:

October 25, 1989

Record:

None

/
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Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
136 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. C-87-357
Judge Michael R. Murphy

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of
October, 1991.

Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was

represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson.

Defendant

F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters the following:
STGL\082.vc

00812

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both

plaintiff

(hereafter

"Wade")

and

defendant

(hereafter "Stangl") are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The
contract or contracts involved in this dispute were entered into
by the parties in Salt Lake County, Utah.

The real estate which

was the subject of this dispute is located within Salt Lake County,
Utah.
2.

Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May

16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, 6.87 acres
of real property for the price of $206,100.
purchase

price

installments.

was

payable

to

Stangl

in

The balance of the
79

equal

monthly

While the contract references an attached Exhibit

A describing the property purchased by Wade, no such exhibit was
ever attached to the contract.
3.

The property sold (hereafter "Wade's Property") consisted

of a parcel of land located at approximately 9200 South, 700 East,
Sandy City, Utah.

The 6.87 acres comprising Wade's Property were

part of a larger tract of land owned by Stangl containing 9.63
acres.

Stangl retained ownership of the remaining 2.76 acres. As

depicted on the County Recorder's plat attached hereto as Exhibit
A, Wade's Property is generally situated behind Stangl's retained
property with respect to 700 East Street, and is accessed by a 50foot wide strip of land which also serves as a non-exclusive rightof-way for access to Stangl's property.

STGL\082.vc
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Wade's Property, which
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includes the underlying fee to the right-of-way tract and totals
6,87 acres, is described more particularly in Exhibit B hereto.
4.

Pursuant to the written 1978 contract, Wade eventually

paid Stangl the agreed-upon purchase price of $206,100.
5.
11

Paragraph 6 of the 1978 written contract provides that

[r]eal property taxes for the year 1978 shall be prorated at the

closing."

The parties did in fact prorate the 1978 taxes based on

(1) the number of days of the year each party owned the property,
and (2) the area (square footage) owned by each party as compared
to the total area of the 9.63-acre consolidated tract.
6.

The parties intended and assumed that they would be

separately taxed on their respective parcels following the year of
the closing

(1978) .

The county taxing authorities, however,

continued to assess and tax Stangl for the entire 9.63-acre
consolidated tract and did not individually tax the parties1
separate parcels because no conveyance of Wade's Property had taken
place, nor was any conveyance yet required under the terms of the
installment land contract (which had a 6%-year executory period).
6.

During the years

1979, 1980 and

1981, the parties

continued their practice of apportioning the property taxes based
on the square footage or acreage owned by each party as compared
to the total

amount

of

land within the consolidated

tract.

Beginning with the year 1982, Wade failed and refused to pay any
amount for taxes on the subject property and has at all times since

STGL\082.vc
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failed and refused to pay any amount toward the appurtenant
property taxes.
7.

In 1980, the parties orally agreed to split the tax

liability for the consolidated tract according to the proportionate
amount

of

land

prospectively

owned

resolved

between the parties.

by

each

party.

This

the issue of tax

oral

liability

agreement
allocation

The primary reason for the parties1 oral

agreement was that doing so would result in lower taxes for each
party than would be the case if the two parcels were segregated and
separately assessed and taxed. This 1980 oral agreement was either
a separate and subsequent agreement by the parties concerning
property

tax

allocation,

or

was

an

oral

clarification

or

modification of the 1978 written contract which was ambiguous in
that it addressed only the taxes for 1978 (the first year of a 6%year executory contract).

The oral agreement also reflected the

prior conduct of the parties from and after 1978 with respect to
property tax apportionment.
8.

The letters and other documents contained in Exhibit P

of the parties' Stipulation were sent and received by Wade or
someone on Wade's behalf.

Even if there was no subsequent oral

agreement concerning tax apportionment, the documents in Exhibit
P of the Stipulation reflect the parties' intent at the time of
execution of the written agreement and thereafter that the taxes
should be apportioned based on the respective amount of land owned
by each party.
STGL\082.vc
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9.

Therefore, either (1) the 1980 oral agreement was an

amendment to the earlier written contract or was a subsequent
contract which in either case prospectively resolved the issue of
property tax apportionment (which oral agreement was not subject
to the Statute of Frauds because it involved no transfer of an
interest in land but only effected a resolution of property tax
responsibility), or (2) the documents contained in Exhibit P of the
parties1 Stipulation reflect the intent of the parties1 written
agreement that tax apportionment would be based on the area owned
by each party, and such evidence of intent is important and
determinative in resolving the ambiguity concerning future tax
apportionment in the written contract.

Under either of these

alternative findings, the parties conclusively agreed that the
property taxes would be allocated according to the amount of land
owned by each party. The Court did not rely on evidence submitted
by Stangl that the taxes did in fact increase for each party when
the

parties' parcels were

finally

segregated

and

separately

assessed in 1991.
10.

Until the 1991 tax year, the consolidated 9.63-acre tract

of land was never separately assessed to establish individual taxes
for Wade's 6.87 acres and Stangl's retained 2.76 acres.

Instead,

Stangl has been taxed each year for the consolidated property as
a single, undivided parcel. In order to avoid loss of the property
through a tax sale, Stangl has paid the property taxes assessed
against the entire consolidated tract each year since 1978 except
STGL\082.wc
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for the years 1990 and 1991, which taxes have not yet been paid.
Stangl has agreed and is responsible to pay the full amount of said
1990 taxes on the consolidated property provided that Wade first
satisfies in full the judgment

entered by this Court, which

judgment includes apportionment of the 1990 taxes. Beginning with
the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will be separately taxed and the
parties will be individually responsible for payment of the taxes
assessed against their respective parcels for each year from and
after 1991.
11.

Stangl

has

been

paid

in

full

by

Wade

for Wade's

proportionate share of the 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 taxes. Wade
is, however, liable to Stangl for Wade's proportionate share of the
taxes for 1982 through 1990, together with prejudgment interest
thereon at the legal rate. The amount of said 1982-1990 taxes and
interest was stipulated by the parties to be $74,652, as indicated
in Exhibit

C hereto.

Exhibit

C accurately

sets

forth the

apportioned property taxes for the tax years 1982 through 1990
based on the acreage owned by each party and the equal division of
acreage beneath the right-of-way.

For the 1991 tax year, the two

parcels will for the first time be taxed separately.

Therefore,

no apportioned amount is included in Exhibit C for the year 1991.
Exhibit C also accurately sets forth the prejudgment interest on
Wade's proportionate share of the taxes in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). As reflected by Exhibit C, the total amount
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of taxes and prejudgment

interest owed by Wade to Stangl is

$74,652.
12.

In August

of

1989,

Stangl

engaged

Strategis Asset

Valuation and Management Company to appeal the amount of taxes
assessed

to

the

consolidated

property

for

1989.

Strategis

succeeded in lowering the 1989 taxes from $27,029.80 to $11,752.02,
a savings of $15,277.78 to both parties.
action was
$5,087.50.

33.3% of the reduction

Strategis1 fee for such

amount

of

$15,277.78, or

This amount is properly considered a tax-related

expense inuring to the benefit of both parties and was therefore
properly added to the tax amount for 1989 to be apportioned between
the parties along with the tax for that year as shown in Exhibit C.
13.

It is appropriate that acreage apportionment of the

property taxes extend beyond the time when Wade completed his
installment payments and continue until the time the parties'
parcels were severed and separately assessed and taxed (i.e.,
through the 1990 tax year) because of: (1) Wade's failure, despite
an appropriate discovery request, to produce or identify relevant
documents that he claimed to have drafted; (2) Wade's failure to
communicate in a reasonable and timely manner with his attorney or
attorneys (or with opposing counsel and/or this Court if Wade had
no attorney); and (3) Wade's overall failure to involve himself in
the lawsuit he initiated.
14.

The Court generally credited

discredited
STGL\082.wc
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because
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Stangl's testimony and
of,

inter

alia, Wade's
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admitted fraudulent activities that took place contemporaneously
with this lawsuit.

Wade's insistence that he at all times relied

entirely on Stangl in connection with all relevant issues is
indicative to the Court of fraudulent conduct and of an attempt by
Wade to alter or withhold the truth.
15.

The Counterclaim against Wade, filed December 21, 1988,

has never been answered.

Technically, therefore, Wade is in

default. The Counterclaim seeks dismissal of Wade's Complaint with
prejudice, reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and
interest thereon at the legal rate, and attorneys fees and costs.
Stangl is entitled to such relief.
16.

Paragraph 15 of the parties' 1978 written agreement

provides that, in the event of a default under the agreement, the
prevailing party shall recover from the losing party reasonable
attorneys fees and costs. There is no requirement in the agreement
for notice of said default in order for the right to attorneys fees
to attach.

Even if notice of default was required to receive

attorneys fees, trial Exhibit CC reflects that Wade was given
notice of his default.
share

of the property

Because Wade failed thereafter to pay his
taxes, said default

was never cured.

Stangl's 1988 Counterclaim, of which the Court takes judicial
notice,

is further notice to Wade of his default under the

contract.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the trial the parties

stipulated that their dispute focused on said written agreement and
that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees.

STGL\082.wc
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is the prevailing party and is therefore entitled to reasonable
attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.
17.

F.C. Stangl Construction Company check No. 55499, payable

to Stanley L. Wade in the amount of $52,776.00, was hand-delivered
to A. Paul Schwenke, the attorney of record and the attorney in
actuality for Wade, on behalf of and as agent for Wade.

A

withdrawal of counsel A. Paul Schwenke, purportedly executed on
March 7, 1989, was never filed with the Court and was not served
on opposing counsel despite a certificate of service to the
contrary.
continued

Even if the withdrawal had been filed, Mr. Schwenke
to

represent

Wade

by,

for

example,

prosecuting

a

successful Motion for Summary Disposition with the Utah Supreme
Court in July 1989 and by filing a Certificate of Readiness for
Trial with this Court on May 24, 1990.

The Court takes judicial

notice of the fact that Mr. Schwenke continued to file numerous
pleadings on Wade's behalf, the first one (a notice to submit for
decision) dated only six days after the purported withdrawal of
counsel. The only withdrawal of counsel by Mr. Schwenke was filed
with the Court on January 9, 1991.
acknowledged

on March

25, 1990

Wade's sworn affidavit,

(trial Exhibit

Y) , expressly

references an accompanying affidavit prepared by Wade's attorney,
Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Schwenke's affidavit itemizes costs and services
rendered
STGL\082.wc
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behalf

over a period
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exceeding

one year

following Schwenke's purported withdrawal from the case on March
7, 1989. Wade's affidavit convinces the Court that Wade was aware
of Mr. Schwenke's ongoing representation.

In light of the above,

the unfiled withdrawal of counsel does not constitute a withdrawal
from the case by Mr. Schwenke.

The agency relationship between

Wade and Schwenke therefore continued to abide until January 9#
1991, when Schwenke formally withdraw as counsel.
18.

Alternatively, even if Mr. Schwenke did inform Wade that

he was withdrawing as counsel, Wade failed to adhere to his
obligation to timely communicate the withdrawal to this Court
and/or to opposing counsel. Instead, Wade knowingly neglected this
action from the date of Schwenke's purported withdrawal in March
1989 until Wade engaged his present counsel in February 1991.
Wade's

complete

failure

to attend

in any way

to a pending

proceeding justifies and excuses any and all good faith actions
taken by opposing counsel during Wade's neglect of this matter.
19.

Accordingly, A. Paul Schwenke was, at the time said check

was tendered to him, Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality
and by appearance.

The subsequent alteration of the check is

deemed to be the act of Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any
offset or credit with respect to said check or with respect to the
funds represented by said check.

Stangl is deemed to have repaid

in full the sum he was obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this
Court's Order of November 21, 1989.

STGL\082.vc
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or

20.

Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by

the Court against Wade, Stangl is to convey to Wade the property
described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way
described above, in accordance with the terms of the parties1
written agreement.
21.

The Court wishes to note that Bruce J. Nelson, Wade's

present counsel, was not associated in any way with Wade's prior
counsel and had no involvement whatsoever with the fraudulent and
unethical activities alleged by Wade to have taken place earlier
in the course of this dispute.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has proper jurisdiction over the parties and

the subject matter hereof.
2.

Stangl

is entitled

to a judgment

from Wade, which

judgment should be entered in accordance with the Findings and
Conclusions herein.
3.

As explained in the foregoing Findings of Fact, the

property taxes attributable to the consolidated tract of land
containing the parties' respective parcels should properly be
allocated between the parties according to the proportionate amount
of area owned by each party, as set forth in Exhibit C.
4.

Because of Wade's breach of the parties' written and/or

oral agreement or agreements, Wade is liable to Stangl for Wade's
STGL\082.wc
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proportionate share of the property taxes for the years 1982
through 1990, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the
legal rate, which sums amount to a total of $74#652.00. Stangl is,
therefore, pursuant to his Counterclaim filed on December 21, 1988,
entitled to a judgment in his favor of $74,652.00, plus postjudgment interest at the legal rate, plus whatever amount of
attorneys

fees

and

costs

the

submission of evidence of same.

Court

deems

appropriate

upon

Additionally, Wade's Complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice.
5.

As the prevailing party, Stangl is entitled to reasonable

attorneys fees and costs, evidence of which is to be submitted to
the Court by affidavit in accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.
6.

At the time Stangl's check No. 55499 in the amount of

$52,776.00 was tendered to A. Paul Schwenke, Mr. Schwenke was
Wade's agent in law and in fact, by actuality and by appearance.
The subsequent alteration of the check is deemed to be the act of
Wade, and Wade is not entitled to any offset or credit with respect
to said check or with respect to the funds represented by said
check.

Stangl is deemed to have repaid in full the sum he was

obligated to repay to Wade by virtue of this Court's Order of
November 21, 1989.
7.

Stangl is responsible to pay the full amount of the 1990

taxes on the consolidated property, provided that Wade first

STGL\082.wc
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satisfies in full the judgment to be entered by this Court, which
judgment will include apportionment of the 1990 taxes.
8.

Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties7 properties

will be separately taxed and the parties will be individually
responsible

for payment

of the taxes assessed

against their

respective parcels for each year from and after 1991.
9.

Upon full satisfaction of the judgment to be entered by

the Court against Wade, Stangl shall be obligated to convey to Wade
the property described in Exhibit B, subject to the non-exclusive
right-of-way described in said Exhibit.
MADE AND ENTERED this 3/'"

day of

(DrTs\(~tA .

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

Awlw^ K
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPH)
District Judge, State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on thirfs* jHUday of October, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to:
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Exhibit D

Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
136 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

Tfih'ci JIJI:..^! District

NOV 1 1991

Daniel A. Jensen (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

a^iyifl
IhS^l-^lct^.

STANLEY L. WADE,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-87-357
Judge Michael R. Murphy

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for a bench trial before the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, on the 4th day of
October, 1991.

Plaintiff Stanley L. Wade was present and was

represented by his counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson.

Defendant

F.C. Stangl III was present and was represented by his counsel of
record, Stephen G. Crockett and Daniel A. Jensen. The Court having
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received sworn
testimony, exhibits and other evidence at trial, having heard
arguments of counsel, having entered its Findings of Fact and
STGL\083.vc
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Conclusions of Law, having received appropriate affidavits in
support

of attorneys' fees, and being

fully

advised

in the

premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

2.

Defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiff in

accordance with the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

The amount of said judgment is as follows:
Plaintiff's proportionate share of property
taxes for 1982-1990

$54,835

Pre-judgment interest thereon at the legal
rate

$19,817

Attorneys' fees and costs

%VLL^L1I

TOTAL

tftttfl.

*t °

f 0

"
P M

^

Defendant is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the legal
rate and costs incurred in satisfaction of said judgment.
3.

Upon full satisfaction of this judgment by plaintiff,

defendant shall (1) pay the full amount of the 1990 taxes on the
parties' consolidated property, and (2) convey to plaintiff the
property described in Exhibit B to the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, subject to the non-exclusive right-of-way
described in said Exhibit.
4.

Beginning with the 1991 tax year, the parties shall be

individually

responsible

for

payment

of

the

property

taxes

separately assessed against their respective parcels of land.

STGL\083.vc
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DATED this \*b

day of / ^ ^ H ^ t ^

1991>

BY THE COURT:

~Ku^ X . '/>
HONORABLE MICHAEL. R.
R. MURPHY~T
MURPHY /
District Judge, State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this .Jl^^^day
of October, 1991,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was handdelivered to:
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

'toa^ia-^J
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Exhibit E

ssPH'tt

Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
136 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

IRICT

^^r

Daniel A. Jensen (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,

>iH^7?
PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT

vs.
F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant.

Civil No. C87-357
Honorable Michael R. Murphy

F. C. STANGL III, defendant in the above-captioned matter,
hereby gives notice through his counsel of record:
1.

That on November 1, 1991, the Court entered judgment in

his favor and against plaintiff Stanley L. Wade in the amount of
$100,699.90, which judgment was docketed on November 5, 1991.
2.

That on June 11, 1992, defendant collected $86,843.97

from plaintiff in partial satisfaction of said judgment.
3.

That on June 11, 1992, plaintiff owed defendant $7,217.29

in post-judgment interest at the legal rate of 12% pursuant to Utah
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Code Ann. § 15-1-4, together with the full principal amount of the
$100,699.90 judgment.
4.

That after deducting plaintiff's payment of $86,843.97

from the total amount owing as of June 11, 1992, plaintiff still
owed defendant $21,073.22 pursuant to said judgment plus postjudgment interest at the legal rate of 12% from and after June 11,
1992.
5.

That on July 1, 1992, defendant collected an additional

$19,543.00 from plaintiff in partial satisfaction of said judgment.
6.

That on July 1, 1992, plaintiff owed defendant $138.56 in

post-judgment interest at the legal rate of 12% pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-4, together with the remaining judgment amount of
$21,073.22.
7.

That after deducting plaintiff's payment of $19,543.00

from the total amount owing as of July 1, 1992, plaintiff still
owes defendant $1,668.78 pursuant to said judgment plus postjudgment interest at the legal rate of 12% from and after July 1,
1992.
8.

That plaintiff has partially satisfied the interest-

accruing judgment against him to the extent of $106,386.97, but as
of July 1, 1992, still owes defendant $1,668.78 pursuant to said
judgment.

STGL\104.vc
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DATED this

JP

day of July, 1992.
KIMBALL, PARR. WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

DanTelA^-tjensen
Attorneys forUDefendant

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this &'
day of July, 1992, by DANIEL A. JENSEN.
Notary Public

^

H<i

185 So. State St #1300 I
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 .
September 20,19^3
State of Utah

\

NOTARY/PUBLIC, residing' in

My commission expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this (£_
day of July, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Stanley L. Wade
2159 East Parley's Terrace
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
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Exhibit F

A G R E E M E N T
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this
//(A*i

/£1—

day of

t 1978, by and between STANLEY WADE, hereinafter referred

e /*1
to as'"Buyer,"
and F. C. STANGL III, hereinafter referred to as

"Seller," with reference to the following facts:
A.

Seller is the owner of a certain tract of real property

located in Sandy City, Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is more
particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference as Parcels 1 and 2. Parcel 2 of the land
as described above and on Exhibit "A" hereto is sometimes referred
to herein as the "Property"'.
B.

Seller desires to sell the Property to Buyer and Buyer

desires to purchase the Property from Seller oh the terms herein set
forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
and promises herein set forth, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Purchase Price; Paynent.

for the Property shall be $206,100.

The total purchase price

The purchase price will be paid to-

Seller in the following manner:
1.1

Buyer has heretofore paid $1,000 to Seller as

earnest money, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.
1.2

The additional sum of $49,000 shall be paid by

Buyer to Seller at the time of closing, which closing
shall be on or before May f/j>, 1978.
1.3

The balance of $156,100, together with interest

on the unpaid balance frorr. and after closing, at the rate
of 8-1/2% per ann\m, shall be- paid a a fcllov:s:
Seventy-nine (79) equal monthly installments
of principal and interest in the amount of $2,586,91
each, with the firstt payment being due and payable
on Juiy 1, ±97b, wirn interest from the t-lo»xug
date to June 1, 1978, to be paid by Seller at the
closing.

No prepayment shall be allowed vithouQQftQl

Seller's express written consent.
2.

Encumbrances.

It is understood and agreed that after

closing there will exist against the Property and Parcel 1 a Trust
Deed securing a Note in favor of Ralph K. Tolman and Betty R. Tolman
(hereinafter referred to as the underlying obligation) copies of
which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by
reference and those easements and restrictions, as listed on Exhibit
*C" Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Upon

closing Buyer will accept the Property subject to the underlying obligation and to those easements and restrictions.

Seller will, however,

so long as Buyer is current on his obligations hereunder, make all
payments due on the underlying obligation.
3.

Substitution of Security.

Should Buyer desire to

develop the Property and thus need fee title thereto unencumbered by
the underlying obligation'prior to the time that the underlying oblige
is paid in full by Seller, Seller will, at Buyer's request, exercise
its rights to substitute security as provided in the Trust Deed securing the underlying obligation.

Buyer shall provide a portion of the

substituted security equal to the then unpaid balance hereunder. .Tha
security shall be deemed substituted security for the purposes of thi
agreement also and upon receipt of Buyer's substituted security and a
release of the underlying obligation Seller will deed the property to
Buyer.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall not prepay this

agreement, but shall continue to pay according to the terms hereof
(which payment shall be secured by the substituted security), unless
Seller consents to a prepayment.
Should Seller desire to obtain a release of the Parcel
1 property (even though Buyer might not yet want a release of Farcel
2), Buyer will then be required to put up his share of the substitut
security as hereinabove set forth and will at that tine receive a
deed to the Property free and clear of the underlying encumbrances.
Buyer shall# nevertheless, continue to make the payments reguired
her -m-\P~- A — * *1 --^ri? *n f""» I according to the terras hereof (which
payment shall be secured by the substituted security) unless Seller
shall consent to a prepayment.
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4.

Title.

At closing Seller shall provide to Buyer a

preliminary title report in the form of Exhibit

W

D M attached hereto,

showing title to be in accordance with this Agreement.

Seller agrees

that upon recordation of the Warranty Deed delivered pursuant to this
Agreement, title will vest in Buyer subject only to those matters
and things allowed by this Agreement or approved by Buyer's attorney.
5.

Conveyance.

The conveyance of the Property to Buyer

pursuant to this Agreement shall be by Warranty Deed subject only to
the matters and things allowed by this Agreement.
^*

Taxes.

Real property taxes for the year 1978 shall be

prorated at the closing.
7.

Possession - Closing Date.
7.1

Buyer shall enter into possession of the Property

immediately after the closing.

The closing shall be on

or before Kay //,? , 197 8, and shall be at a mutually
convenient location.
7.2

At the closing, Buyer shall deliver to Seller

the sum due under subparagraph 1.2 of this Agreement,
plus such other sums as may be required to pay any closing
charges and prorations, attributable to Buyer.
7.3

As of the close of business on the day prior to

closing, the parties shall prorate all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance with the
latest tax and assessments bills.
7.4

The closing shall be completed by the parties

delivering to each other a statement listing all credits
and debits to each party for prorations and closing
fees required under this Agreement.

This statement shall

be conclusively presumed to be correct unless a party
protests such statements at the time of the closing.

The

closing shall be completed by the Buyer delivering to
th~ Qo*-1— *-*-- —*C5 required i{y subDaranraph 1.2 hereof,
plus or minus prorations.

Upon the accomplishment of

the foregoing, the closing shall be deemed complete and
Buyer will be entitled to enter into possession of the

003^1
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Property.
8

*

Default.

If Buyer fails, neglects, or otherwise

refuses to make any of the payments herein agreed to be made when due,
a default shall occur, and if Buyer fails to cure said default within
ten (10) days after written notice as herein required, Seller shall have
the remedies set forth hereafter in this paragraph.

If Buyer defaults

in any other material term or condition of this Agreement, and such
default continues for a period of twenty (20) days, Seller may notify
Buyer in writing of such default and of Seller's election to exercise
his rights hereunder by notice as herein required.

If Buyer has not

cured such default within the times above specified. Seller, at his
option, and without further notice, shall have the remedies set forth
hereinafter in this paragraph.
8.1

Seller shall have the right to be released from

all obligations in law and in equity to convey any
unconveyed property, and all payments which have been
made theretofore by the Buyer shall be forfeited to the
Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of
the Agreement and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may
at his option re-enter and take possession of the unconveyed property without legal processes as in its firs*
and former estate, and Buyer becoming at once a tenant
at will of the Seller.
8.2

Seller may bring suit on this contract and re-

cover judgment for all unpaid principal and accrued
interest, together with costs and attorney's fees.

The

use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not
prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to a
different remedy at a later date.
8.3

The Seller shall have the right, at his option,

and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the
entire unpa^u L w — —

h

ur."

* ->r" du* and payable,

and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer subject thereto, and

soici

«nc3 the proceeds applied to the payment, ^f the balance

owingr including costs and attorney's fees, and Seller may
have a judgment against Buyer for any deficiency which
may remain. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately
entitled to the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the
obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant to order
of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of
foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of the
said premises during the period of redemption.
8.4

After a substitution of security and deeding of the

Property as provided in paragraph 2 above. Seller's remedies
shall be against the substituted security as provided in the
letter of credit accepted as substituted security and shall
not be against the Property.
9.

Brokerage Indemnity. Bach party hereto hereby agrees

that he will indemnify, defend and hold the other party hereto and his
employees harmless

from and against

and in respect

of any claims

of

brokerage and other commissions relative to this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby or any of the documents to be executed pursuant hereto, which claims are based in any way on agreements made by or
behalf of the indemnifying party with any other party Or parties whatsoev
10.

Binding on Heirs and Assigns. This Agreement is and

shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto
and their respective heirs, successors and assigns.
11.

Compliance with Applicable Lavs.

Buyer agrees that,

at all times prior to the deeding of the Property to Buyer, he will
comply with all federal, state and local laws, regulations, rules and
orders applicable to the Property or activities or operations thereon
or in connection therewith.
12.

Title Insurance. At the time the Property is deeded

to Buyer p*:rsu*nt to the L-rr

*>e

»*. e * T * — '•'--oi *"»,>{ch to Buyer a

standard owner's policy of title insurance insuring title to be as set
forth in paragraph 4 above.
13.

0Q395

Survey - Acreage. This Agreement is mad<3 based upon

sold and purchased contains 6.87 net useable acres, in Sandy City.

Shoul

the Property, on survey, contain more or less than 6.87 net useable
acres, the purchase price will be adjusted up or down based on a per
acre price of $30,000.
14.

Entire Agreement.

It is expressly understood by the

parties hereto that there are no representations, covenants or agreements between the parties with reference to the Property or the
transaction contemplated hereby except as herein specifically set
forth or attached hereto.
15.

Attorney's Fees.

In the event there is a default

under this Agreement and it becomes reasonably necessary for either
party to employ the services of an attorney, either to enforce or
terminate this Agreement, with or without litigation,, the losing party
to the controversy arising out of the default shall pay to the
successful party a reasonable attorney's fee and, in addition, such
costs and expenses as are incurred in enforcing or in terminating
this Agreement.
16.

Notices.

Except as otherwise specifically provided,

all notices, demands and other communications hereunder shall be in
writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given and delivered if
mailed by United States certified and registered mail, postage prepiad,
to the parties or their assignees at the following addresses or such
other addresses as are given in writing from one party to the other:
Buyer:

Stanley Kace

-sue <Lo*w
Seller:

*H<cj

F. C. Stangl III
c/o Denis R. Morrill, Esq.
4 55 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN WITNESS lTHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreer.er.t
on the day and year first above written.
SELLER

00396

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss

1978, personally
^
appeared before me F. C. Stangl III, a signer of the foregoing
On t h i s

M~i<i^ day of

instrument, who duly acknowledged to ir.e that he executed the same.

Kofi
Res

w£y&&~*p, «*<•'

My Commission expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On this

)
: ss
)
/{/~f&

day of

_, 1978, personally

appeared before me Stanley Wade, a signer of the foregoing instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

— - j ' s

, TMzUl

My Commission e x p i r e s :

00397
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Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

i

4sW^
:TRICT
r.'i'i

L-- -

'!#*£

Daniel A. Jensen (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
>
]

STIPULATION

;

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant.

]i
|

Civil No. C-87-357
Judge Michael R. Murphy

In connection with the pending trial of the above-referenced
matter, plaintiff Stanley Wade ("Wade") and defendant F.C. Stangl
III ("Stangl"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby
stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

Pursuant to a written installment land contract dated May

16, 1978, Wade agreed to buy, and Stangl agreed to sell, certain
real property for the price of $206,100. A true and exact copy of
said contract is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

STGL\080.vc

00690

of all mathematical calculations in this Stipulation that are based
on such acreages.
4.
Exhibit

As evidenced by the County Recorder's plat attached as
E, the

Subject

Property

(i.e., Wade's

property)

is

accessible from 700 East Street by a 50-foot wide non-exclusive
right-of-way

located along the northern boundary

retained property.

of Stangl's

The parties agree that, if acreage-based

apportionment of the taxes is found by the Court to be appropriate,
the acreage beneath the right-of-way (amounting to 0.55 acres for
a parcel measuring 50 feet by 476.14 feet) should be evenly divided
between the two parties.
5.

Pursuant to the 1978 installment land contract (Exhibit

A), Wade paid Stangl $50,000 at closing and, eventually, the
balance of $156,100 plus 8%% interest, which balance was payable
in 79 equal monthly installments of $2,586.99.
6.

Until the 1991 tax year, the consolidated 9.63-acre tract

of land containing the Subject Property has never been separately
assessed to establish individual taxes for Wade's 6.87 acres and
Stangl's 2.76 acres. Instead, Stangl has been taxed each year for
the consolidated property as a single, undivided parcel. Beginning
with the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will be separately taxed.
7.

Exhibits F through N are true and correct copies of the

annual Tax Notices received by Stangl from the Salt Lake County
Treasurer for the consolidated property for the tax years 1982
through 1990, respectively.
STGL\080.vc

-3-

11.

As evidenced by the documents attached as Exhibit 0,

Stangl has paid the property taxes assessed against the entire
consolidated tract each year since 1978 except for the year 1990,
which taxes have not yet been paid.

Stangl hereby agrees to pay

the full amount of said 1990 taxes on the consolidated property in
the event that the Court awards Stangl a judgment based on acreage
apportionment which includes the 1990 taxes.
12.

As evidenced by the documents attached as Exhibit P, Wade

reimbursed Stangl for a portion of the property taxes for the years
1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 as set forth below:
Tax Year

Amount Paid
by Wade

Date Paid

1978
1979
1980

$1,410.34
$2,381.04
$2,654.13

12/26/78
05/13/81
01/04/82

1981

$3,304.73

01/07/82

As also evidenced by the documents attached as Exhibit P, the
amounts paid by Wade during the above-listed years were based on
the acreage or square footage of the land owned by Wade as compared
to the total amount of land within the consolidated tract.
13.

Recognizing

that

the

parties

disagree

as

to

the

appropriateness of apportioning the property taxes based on the
percentage of acreage owned by each party, the parties agree that
if

acreage-based

apportionment

is

found

by

the

Court

to

be

appropriate, Exhibit Q accurately sets forth under the heading of
"Tax Assessed" the yearly amounts properly subject to apportionment
between the parties, as determined from the county's Tax Notices
STGL\080.wc

-5-

nftftQii

tor

the years 1982 through 1990 (Exhibits F through N) modified as

follows:
(a)
the

property

In 1984, Stangl persuaded Salt Lake County to reduce
tax

assessment

on the

jointly-owned

property

by

$538.54 for the 1982 tax year and by $746.13 for the 1983 tax year.
These amounts have been deducted from the amounts appearing on the
corresponding annual Tax Notices.
(b)

A small portion of the taxes for the years 1982

through 1986 corresponded to a moveable, skid-mounted building that
was located on Stangl's portion of the property.

The specific

amount attributable to this improvement, as specified and set forth
by the Salt Lake County Assessor in the Tax Notices for those years
(Exhibits F through J ) , has been deducted from the amounts subject
to

apportionment

proportionate

for

the

purposes

share of the property

removed from the property in 1987.

of

calculating

taxes.

Wade's

The building

was

Exhibits K through N, the

county Tax Notices for 1987 through 1990, reflect this absence of
any improvements on the property.
(c)

In 1988 Stangl conveyed 0.65 acres from his part of

the property for use as a public road.

Exhibits L, M and N, the

county Tax Notices for 1988, 1989 and 1990, reflect this reduction
in

the

total

amount

of

acreage.

This

conveyance

modified,

slightly, the ownership percentage of each party.
(d)

In August of 1989, Stangl engaged Strategis Asset

Valuation and Management Company to appeal the amount of taxes

STGL\080.wc

-

0068

assessed

to the jointly-owned

property

for

1989.

Strategis

succeeded in lowering the 1989 taxes from $27,029.80 to $11,752.02,
a savings of $15,277.78 to both parties.
action

was

33.3% of the reduction

$5,087.50.

Strategis' fee for such

amount

of

$15,277.78, or

Tivie—amount—should—properly—be—concidorod—a—tax-

rclatod—oxponce inuring to—the—benefit—of—both

parties—and—ie

therefore—added—to—the—tax—amount—£os—1989—to—be—apportioned
between the parties along with the tax for that year.
14.

The

parties

further

agree

that

if

acreage-based

apportionment is found by the Court to be appropriate, Exhibit Q
accurately sets forth the apportioned property taxes for the tax
years 1982 through 1990 based on the acreage owned by each party
and the equal division of acreage beneath the right-of-way.

For

the 1991 tax year, the two parcels will for the first time be taxed
separately.

Therefore, no apportioned amount is included in

Exhibit Q for the year 1991.
15.

The

parties

further

agree

that

if

acreage-based

apportionment is found by the Court to be appropriate and if the
Court determines that Stangl is entitled to prejudgment interest
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1(2) on Wade's share of
the taxes so apportioned, Exhibit Q accurately sets forth the
prejudgment interest on Wade's proportionate share and the total
amount of taxes and interest owed by Wade to Stangl.

STGL\080.vc

-7-

0£G?6

DATED this

3

day of October, 1991.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Daniel A
Attorneys fo

ruce J, Nelson
Attorneys for Plaintiff

^C^s*^.

S^)^.
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December 8 , 1980
CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.R.
CERTIFICATE NO. 0596800

Mr. Stanley Wade
2159 P a r l e y ' s Terrace
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84109
Dear Stan:

Please consider this letter as notification of the following
items:
1.

A billing for your portion of the 1980 property taxes as per
the Purchase Agreement on the land located at 9225 South 7th
East in Sandy, Utah.

2.

A notice of your default of the aforementioned Purchase Agreement for nonpayment of the 1979 property taxes and interest
owed for the period between the closing date and the date of
the first payment. (Previous billing enclosed.)

Enclosed is a copy of the tax notice and receipt for payment of
the 1980 property taxes on the land covered by your Purchase Agreement. Your
portion has been computed as follows:
$3,843.80 4 430,340.81 sq. ft. x 284,573.36 sq. ft. - $2,541.81
$3,843.80 T 430,340.81 sq. ft. x 120,617.45 sq. ft. = $1,077.35
$3,843.80 x 430,340.81 sq. ft. x 25,150.00 sq. ft. = $ 224.64
Wade - Basic Area
$2,541.81
h Right of Way
112.32
$2,654.13
Stangl - Basic Area
$1,077.35
k Right of Way
112.32
$1,189.67
To date, the following monies are owed:
*//*'*'
Interest
1979 Property Taxes
1980 Property Taxes
December 1980 Payment

$ 552.85
^
2,381.042,654.13
2,586.41-7 f£$8,174.43
*

f

u/is/to
X,*86.*Z

00730

Page Two

May we please have your check for $8,174.43 made payable to Franz
C. Stangl, III at the above letterhead address within twenty (20) days in
order to correct your existing default and conclude your 1980 obligation as
per the Purchase Agreement.
Sincerely,
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO.

'^

yZianj^

Elizabeth Stangl

EAS:pjw
Enclosures

00731

^ f ^ ^ C ^ ^ T

.

SU.T€300

•

SALTLAKECTY.UTAHM107

S+ECtALiSlS i* COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PLANNING AND

.

PHONE 1801) 2 6 2 0 3 8 1

DBVELOPMEN1

January 4, 1982

Mr. Stanley Wade
2159 Parley's Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah
Mr. Stanley Wade
918 Logan Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

84105

Dear Stan:
1 am writing to acknowledge the receipt of the checks in the
following amounts:
A.

F. C. Stangl's check to you for $2,586.91

B.

Your checks for:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

$
618.52
$10,347.64
$ 2,586.91
$ 2,654.13

Interest
Oct. f81-Jan. f82 payments
Sept. f81 payment
1980 taxes (incorrect $)

We are depositing the above checks in anticipation of (1) your
bringing in the signed documents that I understand you were to bring today,
and (2) your payment of 1981 property taxes.
Apparently you did not understand how the 1981 property tax proration
was achieved. It was figured exactly the same way as were the previous years
taxes as shown on the "corrected billing" (copy enclosed). That is:
Total tax ($4,335.56) i by total acreage (9.632) x Wade
acreage (6.87) « $3,092.33.
Thus of the total $19,511.93 as broken down on the attached "corrected
billing" sheet, agreed as owed, and subsequently written into the new documents
as owing, $16,207.20 has been paid and $3,304.73 is still due.
An additional "corrected billing" sheet has been enclosed showing
paid and due dollars in red. If I have made an error in my computations,
I will be glad to sit down with you so that it may be corrected.

X*

e
.**

However, I expect to either hear from you immediately regarding
any billing error or receive both the dollars due and the signed documents
by return mail.
Sincerely,
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

E l i z a b e t h Stangl
EASrpjw
Enclosures
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Ma

y 14, 1980

S t a n l e y Wad(

Sal? 7 Pa J ley ' S 7 e r r a c *
5>alt Lake City, Utah 84109
Dear Stan:

P««nen

t p o r t l o n

^|^Pr|

u r c

Iahrege^

t e

/a^«/,

| % h e

Tax
Wa

de - Basic Area
% r i g h t of way

Stangl - Basic Area
% r i g h t o f way
TOTAL

,_
'fgg'Jg
238T70T
„
966
100." #7
22g0

3?4~8737

00751

Page two
May 14, 1980
Stanley Wade

In sunnary, the following monies are due:
Interest
1979 Property Taxes
Total Due

$ 552,85
2,381.04
$2,933.89

Kay ve please have your check for $2,933.89 made
payable to Franz C. Stangl at the above letterhead address
by return mail.
Sincerely,

ELIZABETH STANGL
ES:njf
enc:

F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO.
4455 SOUTH 700 EAST . SUITE 300 . SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 • PHONE (801) 262-0381
SPECIALISTS

IN COMMERCIAL

AND

INDUSTRIAL

PLANNING

AND

DEVELOPMENT

November 24, 1986
Mr. Stanley Wade < ^
2159-Bariey's Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

^

0 ^ ^ "^ 0 J]
)LjLf

Dear Stan:
Ehoch Bautista contacted this office on November 19, 1986 regarding your desire to have the 6.87 acres (at 9225 South 700 East you contracted to purchase from me on the 16th day of May, 1978) deeded to you.
You are in default now and you have been continuously in default since
sometime in 1981. I have sent notices to you many times, and as in the
past, you did not respond.
Our most recent letter to you, dated November 3, 1986, written by
Liz Stangl, gave you one last chance to clean up the delinquencies without penalites and interest. You chose to ignore it until after the
November 13, 1986 deadline set in the letter. On November 20, 1986,
someone from your office brought a copy of an A-1 Distributing check
#1040, dated November 13, 1986, made out to F.C. Stangl Construction in
the amount of $19,810.74. This delivery was made a week after the offered
no-penalty dated pa'ssed and the day after I told Enoch Bautista that I
would no longer accept the amount set forth on the November 3, 1986
letter ($19,810.74), but that I would calculate the amount of penalty and
interest as assessed by the Salt Lake County Treasurer for the years of
back taxes and he cculd pay that amount on your behalf. The following is
a list of monies due as quoted to Mr. Bautista:

$2,749.69
$3,781.05
$4,044.79
$4,588.71
$4,654.50
$19,810.74

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Taxes
Taxes
Taxes
Taxes
Taxes

Penalty 2%

Interest to
11/28/86

TOTAL

$54.83
75.62
80.90
91.77
N/A Now

§ 8% $868.81
@ 8%
891.49
§ 8% 625.59
§13%
548.48
N/A Now

$3,665.33
4,748.16
4,751.28
5,228.96
4,654.50

TOTAL DOE ON 11/28/86

The person that left the copy of the
note that says the check will be turned over
significance to me who it is turned over to.
incorrect payee for the incorrect amount and
the date it was offered for payment.

$23,048.23

check also left a handwritten
to Utah Title. It is of no
It is made out to the
dated a date different than
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Mr. Stanley Wade
November 24, 1986
Page Two

If you will prepare a check for the correct amount, $23,048.23\sif
prior to November 28, 1986/ and to the correct payee, namely the seller
under the contract, F.C. Stangl III and give it to me, the deed you
request can be then prepared and delivered to you. I will clear up the
delinquent taxes due to Salt Lake County and deliver you a clear title
insurance policy, as called for in the contract.
You really know hew to try a person's patience!

Sincerely,

F.C. Stangl III

or 755

LAW OFFICES OF

MAAK

&

MAAK

A PftO'CSSiOMAl COKI>0«AriON

3 7 0 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 3 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841II
TCLC^HONC (SOI)

35B-7TOO

E5 L. MAAK
A. MAAK

November 19, 1981
MAILED BY REGISTERED MAIL
AND CERTIFIED MAIL,
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Mr. Stanley Wade
2159 Parley's Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Re:

Agreement dated May 16, 1978 concerning land located at approximately
9225 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah

Dear Mr. Wade:
As you know, I represent F. C. Stangl III in connection
with the referenced Agreement.
By the terms of the referenced Agreement, you have for
some time been obligated to pay to Mr. Stangl the following
amounts:
Four installments, each in
the amount of $2,586.91, due
on the first days of August,
September, October, and
November, 1981
Interest accrued between the
closing date of the Agreement and June 1, 1978
1980 property taxes

$ 10,347.64

Total

$ 13,554.62

552.85
2,654.13

In addition to the foregoing amounts, Mr. Stangl has
incurred attorney's fees in attempting to enforce this Agreement
by virtue of your default. The amount of such attorney's fees is
not yet precisely ascertainable.
Both the undersigned and personnel at Mr. Stangl's
office have mailed and/or delivered to you a large number of

oc

Mr. Stanley Wade
November 19, 1981
Page 2

letters and requests requesting payment of the foregoing sums,
all of which you are obligated to pay by the terms of the Agreement.
In the event that you have not paid to Mr. Stangl the
foregoing sums within ten (10) days after the giving of this
written notice, Mr. Stangl will exercise his rights and remedies
under Section 8.3 of the Agreement"! My advice by my letter of
October 27, 1981 that Mr. Stangl intended to exercise his rights
under Section 8.1 of the Agreement was in error, and you should
disregard that advice.

BAM:rj
cc:

Mr. F. C. Stangl III

Certified No. 4586582

rc
0f;^VK;
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January 29, 1982

Mr. Stanley Wade
2159 Parley1s Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Mr. Stanley Wade
918 Logan Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

» y

84105

Dear Stan:
I apologize for not explaining fully enough how the tax billings
were arrived at.
Until 1981, I was going on the assumption that the amount of Total
Acreage was the same as that indicated on the site plan here in our office.
So, until 1981, 1 was using (1) 9.879 acres as the Total Acreage
involved and (2) a parcel 817 feet x 348.315 feet indicated on our site
plan as yours, plus (3) one half of a parcel 50 feet x 503 feet indicated
on our site plan as the right of way in order to come up with your billing.
After having the property surveyed, we found that the Total Acreage
was only 9.632 acres and that one half of the right of way is within your
6.87 acres. Consequently, I refigured the taxes based on the true numbers.
Since I thought that I had been charging you for your acreage plus part of
the right of way, I frankly assumed I had been overcharging you for taxes,
but it does not work out that way. The square footage I had been charging
you for was actually only 6.82 acres and the Total Acreage was less than I
had figured.
Until 1981 you were charged thus:
Total Tax divided by Total Sq. Ft. x Wade Sq. Ft.
• Wade $
Total Tax divided by Total Sq. Ft. x H Right of Way Sq. Ft. » Wade $
Total Wade Bill
When tax bills were corrected they were computed thus:
Total Tax divided by Total Acreage x Wade Acreage « Wade Bill

00732

Attached is a schedule comparing the two methods shown above and
the results.
I appreciate receiving your check for the balance showing in my
letter of January 4th in the amount of $3,304,73 in anticipation of my
sending the scheduled breakdown.
Sincerely,
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Elizabeth Stangl

EAS:pjw
Enclosures
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SALT LAKE C O U N T Y A S S E S S O R
Room 309 City & County Buiidmg
Salt Lake Oty. Utah 84111/
December 18, 1984
R. MILTON YORGASON
COUNTY ASSESSOR

ELEANOR LEE BRENNAN

The Honorable Board of County Conrrissioners
Room 407, C i t y 4 County Building
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah
84111

Attention:

CHiEF OsPJTY

Re: Parcel No. 38-05-351-006
Serial No. 34A 0175-151
Adjustment of 1981-1983 General
Taxes

D.M. Stewart

Gentlemen:
Ke kindly request that you adjust the 1981, 1982 and 1983 general
taxes on Parcel No. 38-05-351-006 (Serial No. 34A 0175-151) as shown
below and abate all balance, penalties and interest if paid within 30
days.
YEAR

0RI6INAL TAXES

CORRECTED TAXES

S6249.90
4531.84
4335.56

1933
1982
1981

AMOUNT ADJUSTED

S5503.77
3993.30
3820.35
S13317.42 Total due

S746.13
538.54
515.21
I.719.S?

A carwash on t h i s property was double assessed w i t h Parcel No.
28-05-351-001.
I f you agree w i t h our recommendation, please advise the County
Treasurer accordingly
TO. ARTHUR L MDrfCCN CCJr.TY TREASURER

Very t r u l y y o u r s ,

THE BOARD O? C p t f V T . COMV.'SSiONSRS
APOPOVEO t ~ )

OZU'.tO (

)

R. MILTON YORGASON, County Assessor

THIS LETTER AT ITS MEETING HELD ON:

H. olCoW HINDLEY.

co jrrrt) cfwE^m

Comrr.'.ts&lon Ciert

/

RLY:tk
cc: F. C. Stangl, III
6270 S. Van Cott Rd.
SLC, Utah
84121

F

f}

f'

'

*

.

•

*

"

*

EleanorTee Brennan-Fessler
y £ h i e f Deputy
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SAwT L A K t C4TY. U T A H S 4 t 0 7 • PHONE (BOD 232-0381
A\Z it.C^STAtAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

November 3/ 1986

Mr. Stanley Wade
2159 Parley's Terrace
Salt Lake City/ UT 84109
Dear Stan:
Enclosed are copies of the 1985 and 1986 tax notices on the property
located at 9225 South 700 East in Sandy/ Utah,
Following is a breakdown showing your pro rata share of the
aforementioned taxes.
1985
$6/433.55 -j - 9.632 Total acres X 6.87 acres = $4/588.71 - Wade
$6/433.55 -: - 9.632 Total acres X 2.762 acres= $1/844.84 - Stangl
$6,433.55
1986
$6/525.78 -: - 9.632 Total acres X 6.87 acres = $4/654.50 - Wade
$6/525.78 -: - 9.632 Total acres X 2.762 acres= $1/871.28 - Stangl
$6/525.78
The property taxes billed to you on 9/21/82 and 1/30/85 for 1982/
1983 and 1984 are still outstanding.
Thus/ the following monies are due:
$2/741.69
3/781.05
4/044.79
4/588.71
4/654.50
$19/810.74

1982 taxes
1983 taxes
1984 taxes
1985 taxes
1986 taxes
TOTAL DUE

We need to receive a check for $19/810.74 sent to the above
letterhead address by return mail in order to clear this up. If we
receive a check for the total due within ten (10) days of the above dated
letter/ we will waive the tax penalties and accruing interest. If not
received by 11/13/86/ all penalties and interest as assessed by the Salt
Lake Treasurer will be applied.
Sincerely/

Elizabeth Ann Stangl
Property Management
EAS:sde

©0071

Exhibit I

,u *

. - i

Stephen G. Crockett (A0766)
Daniel A. Jensen (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone:
(801) 532-7840

- A \Kic7U

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
F. C. STANGL III,

F.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

|

Defendant.

Defendant

]
•
])

C. Stangl

I
i
III

Civil No. C-87-357
Judge Michael R. Murphy
("Stangl")

hereby

responds

to

plaintiff Stanley L. Wade's ("Wade") Motion for Summary Judgment.
As specifically argued below, Stangl categorically denies (1) that
the material facts of this lawsuit are undisputed and (2) that Wade
is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
DISPUTATION OF WADE'S "RELEVANT" FACTS
Stangl

responds

as follows to the statement

of "relevant"

facts set forth in Wade's supporting memorandum:
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 1, Stangl denies and
disputes

STGL\0A3.wc

that

"[t]he

Salt

Lake

County

assessor

assessed

the

0C4J6

frontage acreage at a higher rate than the rear acreage."

In

reality, both parcels have been taxed as one parcel ever since the
property was sold to Wade. Wade admits as much in his fact No. 2
when he states that "the parcels have not been segregated for tax
purposes," that they cannot be so segregated until a deed is
recorded, and that the two parcels have been taxed as one parcel.
Wade's only support for his assertion that the two parcels
were assessed at different rates is paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke.
paragraphs

of

inadmissible.

the

Schwenke

The opinions recited in those

affidavit

are

hearsay

and

are

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e); Western States

Thrift & Loan Co. v. Bloomauist. 504 P.2d

1019

(Utah 1972).

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Schwenke affidavit also constitute
conclusory and unsubstantiated opinions and are inadmissible for
those additional reasons. Treloggan v. Trelocrgan, 699 P.2d 747
(Utah 1985); Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). Stangl,
therefore, objects to the Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke and Wade's
attempted use of it.
Stangl also disputes Wade's characterization

of the two

parcels as "front" and "rear." Although Wade's parcel is located
behind Stangl's with respect to 700 East Street, Wade's parcel
includes a 50-foot wide right-of-way to 700 East Street so that
access to both parcels is the same.

STGL\043.wc
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With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 2, Stangl agrees that
the parcels have not been segregated for tax purposes, but denies
and disputes that the "larger parcel is taxed as one unit."

It is

the entire parcel (made up of Wade's larger parcel and Stangl's
smaller parcel) that is taxed as one unit.
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 3, Stangl agrees
(except for the same inaccurate reference to the "larger" parcel
as discussed above) that Wade was charged his share of the taxes
based on the area owned by each party (although it was based on
acreage rather than square footage).

Stangl has no knowledge as

to why Wade decided to stop paying on this basis (or any basis)
after approximately three years.
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 4, Stangl agrees that
Wade refused to pay any taxes (after 1981), but denies and disputes
that Wade's refusal was conditioned on a determination of "the
taxes attributable to his portion of the land."

The record

reflects that Wade never offered any excuse for his cessation of
tax payments.

In fact, until recently Wade denied that he owed

any taxes whatsoever for the years 1978 through 1985 (the term of
the

installment

Defendant's

land contract).

First

Request

for

See Plaintiff's Answers to
Admissions

and

First

Set

of

Interrogatories, Response to Interrogatory No. 2.
With regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 5, Stangl agrees that
Wade eventually completed making the required payments in 1985, but

STGL\0A3.wc
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denies and disputes that this "completed" Wade's performance under
the contract. Wade's performance has never been completed because
of his refusal to pay the tax debt attributable to his property.
Under the terms of the contract (Wade's Exhibit A) in paragraph 8,
Stangl is not obligated to convey a deed to the property so long
as Wade is in default, and Stangl alleges that Wade's failure to
pay his tax debt is a default under the contract.
Finally, with regard to Wade's relevant fact No. 6, Stangl
agrees with the facts set forth therein, but notes that the action
was filed on January 13, 1987, rather than January 20, 1987.
As a final, but important, matter with regard to factual
disputes, Stangl points out to the Court that six months ago Wade
argued to the Utah Supreme Court that there are factual disputes
at issue in this matter precluding summary judgment.

The Utah

Supreme Court agreed, and vacated this Court's order of summary
judgment.

The facts of this dispute today are identical to the

facts that existed previously when Wade argued, successfully,
against summary judgment. Wade has not offered any explanation for
the

sudden

disputes.

disappearance

of the

previously

existing

factual

The unexplained abandonment of Wade's prior argument

that summary judgment is inappropriate is compelling evidence of
the amount

of credence that should be given to his present

argument.

STGLV0A3.VC
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DISPUTATION OF WADE'S LEGAL ANALYSIS
The crux of Wade's legal argument is that the Utah Supreme
Court "held as a matter of law that the real estate contract in
question does not provide for on going obligation [sic] for real
estate taxes," and that Wade is therefore only liable for the taxes
attributable

to

his

land

under

the

doctrine

of

equitable

conversion. Wade's supporting memorandum at 2-3. Wade then argues
that the amount attributable should be based on the assessed value
of the property. Thus, Wade does not dispute his liability for the
taxes, but only the amount attributable to his land.
The Supreme Court's only "holding" was that "material facts
are in dispute" and that summary judgment was therefore not
appropriate.

The court's brief explanatory comments concerning

contractual obligations do not amount to findings of fact or
conclusions of law and do not resolve the existing factual and
legal disputes.

Indeed, the case was remanded to this Court for

the taking of evidence and for further proceedings as appropriate
in light of that evidence.

The Supreme Court's order vacating

summary judgment does not resolve the issue of Wade's contractual
liability or the manner in which Wades's liability for back taxes
should be determined.
Wade then attempts to explain why the amount of taxes
attributable to his land should be based on the assessed values of
each parcel. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the

STGL\043.vc
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"assessed value" of the two parcels for each year since 1978. As
Wade acknowledges in his fact No. 2, the parcels have never been
segregated for tax purposes, cannot be so segregated without the
recording of a deed, and have been taxed since 1978 as one parcel.
Wade's counsel has attempted to overcome this problem by providing
calculations according to his belief as to the values of the land
based on hearsay evidence obtained through conversations with
someone at the county assessor's office. Notwithstanding a sincere
attempt, these calculations are nonunderstandable.
Moreover,
erroneous.

the

entire

basis

of

Wade's

calculations

is

Paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of A. Paul Schwenke

states, pursuant to a hearsay conversation, that "the land bought
by the Plaintiff had a gross market value of $20,000.00 per acre."
Yet paragraph 13 of the 1978 sales contract (Wade's Exhibit A)
provides that if after a survey of Wade's property there is more
or less than the contemplated 6.87 acres, "the purchase price will
be adjusted up or down based on a per acre price of $30,000." This
clearly indicates that the parties considered the value of the
property to be $30,000 per acre rather than $20,000 as used in
Wade's calculations.
In any event, Stangl denies and disputes that Wade's approach
to calculating the parties' respective tax liabilities is proper
in fact or in law. Wade has cited no legal authority to show that
the "assessed value" (which is likely impossible to determine in

STGL\043.vc
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any event) is the only or proper method for calculating the taxes
attributable to his land.
Stangl asserts that the proper method, in law and in fact, for
calculating the parties' respective tax liabilities is to apportion
the taxes based on the amount of acreage owned by each party.
Wade's purchase was in the form of a seven-year installment land
contract by which Wade bought 71% of a parcel of land owned by
Stangl.

Stangl retained an adjacent 29% of his property.

The

contract imposed on Wade an obligation to pay a proportionate share
of property taxes and assessments for the year of the closing
(1978) (see Wade's Exhibit A, Jf 6, 7.3) , but the contract did not
state how the real property taxes were to be divided during the
remainder of the seven-year executory period.
Wade paid for his proportionate share of the property taxes
for the years 1978 through 1981 based on the proportionate amount
of acreage owned by each party.

However, since 1982 Wade has

refused to contribute his proportionate share, or any share, of the
real property taxes assessed to the property.

Stangl has been

forced to pay the entire amount himself each year since 1981.
Thus,

for each year in which Wade paid any taxes toward the

subject property the parties used the acreage apportionment method
to divide liability for the real property taxes, with Wade paying
71.34% of the taxes (based on ownership of 6.87 acres of the 9.63-

STGL\043.vc
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acre tract) and Stangl paying 28.66% (based on ownership of 2.76
acres of the 9.63-acre tract).
While the parties' installment land contract (Wade's Exhibit
A) does not expressly specify how the property tax liability is to
be allocated during the seven-year executory period following the
year of the closing, it does state that taxes for the year 1978 are
to be "prorated at the closing" and that "the parties shall prorate
all taxes and assessments relating to the Property in accordance
with the latest tax and assessment bills."
H

6, 7.3.

See Wade's Exhibit A,

It is undisputed that the parties continued to prorate

the taxes according to the acreage owned by each party for the
years 1979, 1980 and 1981.

See Wade's relevant fact No. 3.

The

parties have never used any other method of allocating the property
taxes.

Wade argues, however, that because the installment land

contract does not expressly state how the real property taxes are
to be divided during the balance of the executory period, the
parties' respective tax liabilities should be based on the separate
"assessed values" of the two parcels rather than the acreage owned
by each party as was done in the past.
Wade's after-the-fact legal argument is without basis.

As

this Court recognized earlier in the dispute, the well-established
doctrine of practical construction resolves any dispute as to the
appropriateness of the acreage apportionment method of allocating
the property tax liability.

Under the doctrine of practical

STGL\0A3.wc
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construction# Wade is obligated to continue to pay his share of the
taxes based on his proportionate share of the acreage.
"This rule of practical construction is predicated on the
common sense concept that 'actions speak louder than words.'"
Builouah v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965).

The decision in

Builough clearly shows why Wade's prior actions obligate him to
continue to abide by an acreage apportionment method for dividing
the taxes. In Builough, the losing party argued that the terms of
a written contract were unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence
could not therefore be used to alter or change the contract.
at 22.

The court responded:

Id.

"This is generally true, but there

are exceptions; one of which is that when the parties place their
own construction on it and so perform, the court may consider this
as persuasive evidence of what their true intention was." Id. The
Builough court then went on to thoroughly explain the doctrine of
practical construction, which applies directly to the present
dispute:
This rule of practical construction is
predicated on the common sense concept that
"actions speak louder than words." Words are
frequently but an imperfect medium to convey
thought and intention. When the parties to a
contract perform under it and demonstrate by
their conduct that they knew what they were
talking about the courts should enforce their
interest.
Appellants correctly claim that this
doctrine of practical construction can only be
applied when the contract is ambiguous, and
cannot
be used when the contract
is
STGL\043.vc
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unambiguous. That is undoubtedly a correct
general statement of the law.
[Citations
omitted.] But the question involved in such
cases is ambiguous to whom? Words frequently
mean different things to different people.
Here the contracting parties demonstrated by
their actions that they knew what the words
meant and were intended to mean. Thus, even
if it be assumed that the words standing alone
might mean one thing to the members of this
court, where the parties have demonstrated by
their actions and performance that to them the
contract meant something quite different, the
meaning and intent of the parties should be
enforced. In such a situation the parties by
their actions have created the "ambiguity"
required to bring the rule into operation. If
this were not the rule the courts would be
enforcing one contract when both parties have
demonstrated that they meant and intended the
contract to be guite different.
Id. at 23 (quoting Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 356 P.2d 171
(Cal. I960)) (emphasis added); accord Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v.
Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972).
As in Builough. Wade's prior actions speak louder than his
present words.

The first four years of Wade's undisputed conduct

demonstrate that he understood the taxes were to be allocated on
an acreage apportionment basis.

Even if there is no express

requirement or "ambiguity" in the written terms of the installment
land contract with respect to ongoing tax liability, the parties
have created

the ambiguity

required

to bring

the

rule into

Dperation. For this Court to adopt an assessed value apportionment
scheme would be the equivalent of enforcing one contract when both

'GL\043.vc
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parties have demonstrated that they meant and intended the contract
to be quite different.1
Wade further argues that he is not responsible for any taxes
on his land

after

1984 (the termination

of the contractual

executory period) because of Stangl's alleged default

in not

conveying the property to Wade.

in his

Stangl has alleged

Counterclaim (and alleges here) that Wade beached the contract four
years prior to the termination of the contractual executory period
when he ceased to pay, despite written demands, any amounts toward
the taxes attributable to his property. Under paragraphs 8 and 8.1
of the contract, Stangl was excused from conveying a deed to Wade's
property because of Wade's default four years prior to the default
attributed to Stangl in 1985. Stangl therefore denies and disputes
Wade's assertion that no taxes are owned after 1984.

*In addition to Builough, other Utah cases have similarly and
consistently applied the doctrine of practical construction. See
Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981)
("Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate
by their actions that to them the contract meant something quite
different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."); Zeese v.
Estate of Siecrel. 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975) ("Under the doctrine
of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous and the
parties place their own construction on their agreement and so
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what
their true intention was.
The parties, by their action and
performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent;
the contract should be so enforced by the courts.").
STGL\043.wc
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1

Salt Lake City, Utah

2

October 4, 1991

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

This is Wade v. Stangl,

4

C87-347. Mr. Bruce Nelson here on behalf of the

5

plaintiff, and Mr. Crockett here on behalf of the

6

defendant.

And is the plaintiff present with you?

7

MR. NELSON:

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. CROCKETT:

10

Yes, he is, Your Honor.

Mr. Stangl is present.

Mr. Dan Jensen is also present on behalf of Mr. Stangl.

11

THE COURT: All right.

12

don't think the record may be entirely clear about at

13

this time, and that is, that I recused myself on a

14

specific issue in this case, and not in the case in its

15

entirety.

16

One thing that I

The specific issue being whether or not there

17

should be relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).

18

reason why I recused myself was that the issues on that

19

motion, I felt, might appear to be or could in fact be

20

intrinsically intertwined with prior counsel for the

21

plaintiff, and I had referred to the Utah State Bar

22

some difficulties that I had with prior counsel for the

23

plaintiff.

24

Mr. Nelson, but some other successor counsel before Mr.

25

Nelson came along, had some difficulties also. And I

And successor counsel —

The

and I don't mean

2

A

If the property closed mid-year, half of

the taxes for the year would be owed by the seller, and
the other half would be owed by the buyer.
demonstrate.

Just to

And if the property was a ten acre

parcel, and the buyer bought six acres of it, and the
seller sold four acres of it, the seller would be
charged with 40% of the tax amount. And the buyer
would be charged with 60% of the tax amount based upon
the entire assessment for the entire property.

That

is, the values or the cost of the taxes would be
apportioned that way.
Q

You have reviewed the record, and that

was in fact what occurred in 1978; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

All right. After 1978, what was the

original anticipation that would happen with regard to
payment of taxes for the parcels?
A

We thought that the taxing authorities

would bill each of us for our respective taxes, and we
would each pay our respective taxes for our parcel.
Q

Did that in fact happen?

A

It did not.

Q

What happened instead?

A

The taxing authority, Salt Lake County,

issued one tax assessment for the entire property,
11

1

agreement they are going to dispute was correct, and in

2

fact that did happen.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NELSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

Anything else?
No.
The objection is overruled.

I do think it goes to the weight.

7

Q

(By Mr. Crockett)

Maybe we can do this

8

by stipulation, rather than Mr. Stangl trying to

9

interpret the tax notices.

We have looked at those,

10

and let me proffer that in 19 -- where we have it

11

written down in 1991, the parcel sold to Mr. Wade went

12

from $8,640 in 1990 to $13,812 in 1991.

13

differential —

14

records would show if we put them in?

15

The

would you stipulate that's what the

MR. NELSON:

I'm afraid you are

16

comparing apples and oranges.

17

separated until 1991.

18

parcel assessment in 1990 to just Mr. Wade's portion in

19

'91.

20

The properties weren't

You are comparing the large

MR. CROCKETT:

No, we are comparing the

21

apportionment in 1990 to what Mr. Wade's parcel was

22

obligated in terms of taxes versus what was actually

23

assessed in 1991 after the breakout.

24
25

THE COURT:

It assumes the apportionment

theory.
15
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Exhibit K

A . P a u l Schwenke
#3951
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f

175 South West Temple #300
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 5 3 1 - 1 0 2 9

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.

vs.

)
»
)»
]

AFFIDAVIT OF A. PAUL
SCHWENKE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

>
)

Case No.C87-357

F.C. STANGL III

)

Honorable Michael Murphy

STANLEY L. WADE,
Plaintiff,

Defendant.
I, A.

Paul Schwenke,

after being first duly sworn, deposed

and says s
1.
L. Wade,

I am the attorney of record for the

Plaintiff, Stanley

and in said capacity I have acquired personal knowledge

of the facts stated herein except

where specifically

stated the

statement is of the best knowledge or belief.
2.

I

have

good

faith

belief that the Defendant sold a

larger portion of one large parcel of commercial
Plaintiff.

property to the

The Defendant retained a smaller frontage portion of

the land with a building on

it.

The Plaintiff

took the larger

rear acreage.
3.

The parcels

have not been segregated for tax purposes,

so the larger parcel is taxed as one unit.

The parcels cannot

be segregated until

recorded

a

warranty

deed

is

showing the

partial conveyance.
1

00400

specific

performance,

requiring

the

Defendant

to

deliver

a

warranty deed pursuant to the real estate contract.

5.

Based

on

information

I

obtained

County Assessor's Office, I have discovered
the

land

bought

by

$20,000.00 per acre.
land retained

by the

$20,000 per acre
commercial

the

that the

portion of

Plaintiff had a gross market value of

I also discovered that
Defendant had

footage,

and

the portion

of the

a gross market valuation of

for commercial acre,

square

from the Salt Lake

a

$2.00 per
gross

square foot for

market

value

for

improvements.
6.

That I consulted with

office and

the Salt

Lake County Assessor's

the Salt Lake County Treasurer's office, and based on

the information provided by each office, I was

able to construct

or determine the amount of property taxes actually accrued to the
Plaintiff's

portion

of

the

included in

the memorandum

land.

The

said

computation is

in support of Plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment.
7.

That the real estate contract between the parties award

attorney fees, costs and expenses to the non-defaulting party.
8.

That I have charged $10,042.00 in attorney fees to date

in connection with this case, itemised as follows:
Date
12/18/86
01/ /87
01/19/87
02/24/87
10/13/87
10/14/87
03/20/88

Service performed
Interview client about case
Conference with Stangl
Prep. Summons & Complaint
Telephone Conf. with Crocket
Review file
Telephone conf. with Crocket
Answer interog. Admissions

Hours
.50
2.00
2.00
.25
.20
.20
2.00

Rate
80.00
80.00
80.00
80.00
80.00
80.00
80.00

Amount
40.00
160.00
160.00
20.00
16.00
16.00
160.00

Cf4- n !

11/20/88
12/05/88
12/22/88
01/19/89
02/11/89
02/12/89
02/19/89
02/17/89
03/21/89
03/27/89
04/03/89
04/11/89
04/12/89
04/13/89
04/25/89
06/20/89
06/25/89
06/25/89
06/25/89
06/26/89
06/27/89
06/08/89
06/09/89
06/09/89
10/24/89
11/13/89
02/23/90
03/09/90
03/15/90
03/16/90
03/20/90
03/21/90
03/22/90
9.

2.00
Review -file & motion to amend
.50
Telephone con-f. counsel
1 .50
Review mot. Sum. Jud & ans/co
Prepare statement in Oppositioni 1.00
Prep. & file 59(e) motion

80.00
90.00
90.00
90.00

160.00
45.00
135.00
90.00

11 .00

90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00

990.00
45.00
45.00
180.00
180.00

90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00
90.00

1,170.00
18.00
45.00
27.00
540.00
90.00
90.00
90.00

90.00

1 ,800.00

90.00

180.00

90.00

360.00

90.00

270.00

90.00

270.00

Prepare & file Req. for hearing .50
.50
Prepare & serve Notice
Prep. Wade aff. 8< meet to sign 2.00
2.00
Hearing
Prep 2nd 59(e) motion, a-f-f etc.
13.00
.20
Prepare Notice to Submit
.50
Prepare & file Notice of Appeal
Telephone Conf. Dan Jensen
.30
Prep. Appl . for Stay Order etc. 6.00
Court appearance Supersedeas
1 .00
Court appear. Judge Rigtrup
1 .00
Telephone conf. Deana AIRD INS. 1 .00
Prepare Docketing Statement,
motion for summary disposition,
memorandum and affidavits
20.00
Prepare & file motion & Order
to show cause
2.00
Prepare & file memorandum and
motion for sanctions
4.00
Meet with Blake Jessop, SLC
3.00
county assessor's office
Obtain tax ledger from
Treasurer's office and met
3.00
with Tax Assessor
Prepare and file motion for
summary judgment, memorandum,
affidavits. Meet with Stan
Wade.
24.00
TOTAL

That the Plaintiff has incurred the

90.00
2.160.00
% 10.042.00
-following costs in

connection with the prosecution of this case.
Fil ing fees
Service fees
Supreme Court filing fees
Appeal fees, district court
Photo copies:
01/19/87
03/20/88
01/19/89

75.00
22.00
125.00
35.00
2.60
2.00
.40
3

00402

02/21/89
03/17/89
03/21/89
03/27/89
04/13/89
04/25/89
06/20/89
06/25/89
06/27/89
07/10/89
10/24/89
11/13/89
03/22/90
Lost interest -from ceased funds
TOTAL
10.

That the

16.00
.40
.40
2.40
11.00
.40
.40
9.20
17.00
95.00
1.40
8.40
11.00
$5. 750 . 00
$6,185.r-

total cost to Plaintiff, to date, as a dire

result of this law suit

to

en-force

his

contractual

rights

A

$16,227.00.
Dated this <^__

day of March, 1990.

A. Paul Schwenke
A. Paul

Schwenke, appeared

to me under oath

that he

personally be-fore me and stated

knows o-f

the above

facts to

be true

except the facts he stated to be his belief.
Subscribed and
1990.

v

/

sworn to

before me

J

/

Sir

day of March,

*

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing
in Salt Lake County.

i
My Comnrd s s i o n I n s p i r e s •

this ^ ^

•

Ur

V
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The

subject

property

was

taxed

during the relevant time

based on three separate valuation units;
square

-footage;

(2)

Beginning with the tax

Commercial

to wit:

acreage

(1) Commercial

and (3) Improvements.

year 1978, each o-f

the units

had gross

market valuation (GMV) as -follows:
1.
2.
3.

$2.00 per square -foot o-f -frontage,
$20,000 per commercial acreage.
$6,225.00 -for improvements.

Please see Exh i bi t C.
It

is

undisputed

rear property assessed
para. 13.

It

was located on
Defendant.

that
only

the Plainti-f-f bought 6.87 acres o-f
as

commercial

acreage. Aoreemen t,

is -further not disputed that the only improvement
the

Ulade

portion

o-f

af-f i dav i t ,

the

property

para.

retained

by the

The GMU as per each

valuation unit in 1978, by each party is as -follows:
GMV: <Data -from tax ledger -for tax years

1978, 1979

and 1980, a

true and exact copy is attached hereto as Exh i bi t G,
Val uat i on Un i t
1. Commercial Sq. Ft.
2. Commercial Acreage
3. Improvements
Grand Totals

Wade
-0$137,400.00
-0$137,400.00

Stanol
$ 30,000.00
$ 75,100.00
$ 6,225.00
$111,325.00

Total
$ 30,000.00
$212,500.00
$ 6,225.00
$248,725.00

PERCENTAGE QF LAND GMV;
The percentage

o-f the

total land valuation attributable to each

o-f the parties are computed as -follows:
Total land assessment
Percentage of total

<a)Ulade
$137,400.00

(b)Stanol
105,100.00

(a)/ (c)
=56.66X

(b)/(c)
=43.347.

7

EXHIBIT A

(c)Total
$242,500.00
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